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ABSTRACT 
   
Despite significant growth in research about supply chain integration, many 
questions remain unanswered regarding the path to integration and the benefits that 
can be accrued. This dissertation examines three aspects of supply chain integration 
in the health sector, leveraging the healthcare context to extend the theoretical 
boundaries, as well as applying supply chain knowledge to an industry known to be 
immature in terms of its supply chain practices. 
In the first chapter, a supply chain operating model that breaks away from 
the traditional healthcare supply chain structures is examined. Consolidated Service 
Centers (CSCs) embody a shared services strategy, consolidating supply chain 
functions across multiple hospitals (i.e. horizontal integration) and disintermediating 
several key roles in healthcare supply chains such as the group purchasing 
organizations and national distributors. Through case studies, key characteristics of 
CSCs that enable them to reduce the level of supply chain complexity are examined. 
The second chapter investigates buyer-supplier relationships in healthcare 
(i.e. supplier integration), where a high level of distrust exists between hospitals and 
their suppliers. This context is leveraged to study both enablers and barriers to 
buyer-supplier trust. The results suggest that contracting counteracts the negative 
effects of dependence on trust. Furthermore, the study reveals that hospital buyers 
may, in some situations, perceive dedicated resource investments made by suppliers 
as trust barriers, associating such investments with supplier upselling and 
entrenchment tactics. This runs contrary to how dedicated investments are perceived 
in most other industries. 
In the third chapter, the triadic relationship between the hospital, supplier, 
and physician is taken into consideration. Given their professional autonomy and 
power, physicians commonly undermine hospital efforts in supply base rationalization 
  ii 
and standardization. This study examines whether physician-hospital integration (i.e. 
customer integration) can drive physicians towards supply selection practices that 
align with the hospital’s sourcing strategies and ultimately result in better supply 
chain performance. This study utilizes theory on agency triads and professionalism 
and tests hypotheses through a random effects regression model applied to data 
about hospital financial performance and physician-hospital arrangements. 
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PREFACE 
 
 “Integration” is a term that is used in many different contexts, and it may refer 
to the assimilation of people, organizations, genetics, mathematical functions, and so 
on. In the management domain, integration is generally defined as the coordination 
between entities with the purpose of achieving a higher level of performance.  
Supply chain integration literature looks extensively at both the inter- and intra-
organizational coordination across supply networks in ways that add value to one or 
more of the stakeholders. Two recent meta-analyses that review the relationship 
between supply chain integration and performance reveal that significant nuances 
exist in this relationship. They also conclude that numerous exogenous factors have 
a significant influence on the outcomes (Leuschner, Rogers, and Charvet 2013; 
Mackelprang et al. 2014). Based on these meta-analyses and numerous other 
studies, supply chain integration is generally broken down into three sub-
dimensions: supplier integration, customer integration, and internal integration 
(Flynn, Huo, and Zhao 2010; C. W. Lee, Kwon, and Severance 2007; Leuschner, 
Rogers, and Charvet 2013; Mackelprang et al. 2014).  
Each of the three essays that make up this dissertation focuses on one of the 
three dimensions of integration as it applies to the health sector supply chain (as 
illustrated in Figure 1). The collective contribution that this dissertation provides is 
two-fold. First, healthcare supply chains represent a significant departure in business 
operations compared to other industries, providing a rich context to test theoretical 
boundaries and bring in new insights into the supply chain management field. 
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Second, by applying existing supply chain theory in the healthcare context, this work 
aims to reveal mechanisms for improving healthcare supply chains.  
In 2013, the cost of healthcare in the U. S. amounted to $2.9 trillion or 17.4% of 
GDP.  Yet, U.S. healthcare outcomes were noticeably worse than those of other 
developed countries, according to Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) metrics (Davis et al. 2014).  With 15-30% of typical hospital 
budgets comprises procurement and supply chain activities (Nachtmann and Pohl 
2009), health care supply networks are an obvious target for improvement initiatives 
and innovations. 
The uniqueness of the healthcare industry’s supply chain arises, in part, from the 
high level of complexity in the healthcare industry. Prominent factors that contribute 
to the complexity in healthcare supply chains include: 
 
Figure 1. Supply chain integration dimensions in healthcare 
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 The Mission of Healthcare Organizations. The overriding goal of the 
organization is to improve and even save lives, in many cases regardless of 
profit. In the United States, over 60% of hospitals (about 70% total bed 
capacity) are nonprofit (Mossialos et al. 2015). The nonprofit status of 
hospitals often leads to misaligned or conflicting incentives with suppliers, 
who answer to shareholders and generally operate at higher profit margins 
than hospitals.  
 Supply Chain Intermediation. Health sector supply chains, even more than 
most, involve numerous actors across the supply chain including patients, 
clinicians, provider organizations (hospitals, clinics, etc.), group purchasing 
organizations (GPOs), independent distributors, insurers, and suppliers.  
These various actors are jointly responsible for supply chain effectiveness and 
efficiency. In a typical hospital, 75% of stock-keeping units (SKUs) “owned” 
by the hospital are off site (Darling and Wise 2010). Additionally, many 
hospitals use group purchasing organizations (GPOs) to negotiate pricing for 
over 50% of their supply spend (L. Burns and Yovovich 2014).  
 Range and Criticality of Products. Hospitals have diverse clinical departments, 
each requiring specialized medical devices and pharmaceutical products.  In 
some cases, specific products are the only option for treating a patient; a 
stock-out may quickly result in patient death or long-term disability. 
 Product Complexity. The supplies, particularly physician preference items 
(PPIs) like orthopedic implants and heart assistive devices, are extremely 
expensive, highly complex, often require special handling (sterilization, safety 
precautions, etc.), and change frequently due to medical and technological 
innovations.  These realities, especially the diverse physician choices and 
relative lack of objective product performance data, make it difficult for many 
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hospitals to limit SKUs and build strategic supplier relationships. Furthermore, 
products come to market through a highly regulated environment. Multiple 
agencies including the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), state health 
departments, and accreditation bodies set rules on packaging, storage 
requirements, recommended usage, etc. 
 Physician Involvement in Supply Selection. The physician plays many roles in 
health care delivery such as the knowledgeable professional, perceived 
customer to the hospital, patient’s agent, and treatment selector. Most 
physicians are still in private practice and believe in professional autonomy. 
Many physicians maintain strong relationships with medical device 
manufacturers and are strongly influenced by suppliers in their choice of 
product and treatment (Burns et al. 2009). These factors exacerbate the 
obstacles facing standardization and cost reduction efforts by the hospital. 
While individual characteristics of healthcare supply chains are present in other 
contexts (e.g., professionalized workforce, regulatory pressures, and purchasing-
user tensions), the collective characteristics of health care and their interactions 
make the health care supply chain an exceptional case in its level of complexity.  
Table 1 provides information about the three chapters of this dissertation. 
Table 1. General information about the three essays 
Chapter Focus Theory Methodology 
Chapter 1: The Emergence of 
Consolidated Service Centers in 
Healthcare 
Horizontal 
Integration 
Complex Systems Case Studies 
Chapter 2: Managing Buyer-
Supplier Trust in a Most 
Distrusting Industry 
Supplier 
Integration 
Buyer-Supplier Trust 
Structural 
Equation Model 
Chapter 3: The Role of 
Professional Buyers in a Supply 
Chain Triad 
Customer 
Integration 
Service Triads, 
Agency Theory 
Random Effects 
Regression 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE EMERGENCE OF CONSOLIDATED SERVICE CENTERS IN HEALTHCARE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Hospital supply chains can be conceptualized as complex systems with a large 
number of players and a high degree of interrelatedness among them, creating an 
environment that is difficult to optimize and manage. In recent years, a consolidated 
service center (CSC) strategy has emerged in some healthcare systems, showing a 
strong potential for reducing the complexity in a hospital's supply chain to achieve 
high levels of performance and innovation. We examine three CSCs using a 
qualitative case method to understand the unique characteristics of this supply chain 
strategy, and how CSCs move hospital supply chains towards a less complex state. 
We find that CSCs demonstrate characteristics that distinguish them from other 
supply chain strategies. These characteristics enable the CSC to orchestrate supply 
base rationalization and disintermediation initiatives in the hospital's supply chain to 
effectively reduce the number of components and interrelatedness in this complex 
system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Healthcare supply chains have been described as highly fragmented and 
complex, showing limited improvements in cost and quality over the years (McKone-
Sweet, Hamilton, and Willis 2005; Nachtmann and Pohl 2009; Schneller and 
Smeltzer 2006). Supply chain expenses include medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, 
equipment, distribution, and warehousing. This expense category is the second 
largest category after labor expense, and accounts for up to one-third of the total 
annual expenses incurred by hospitals (Nachtmann and Pohl 2009).  
The Efficient Healthcare Supply Chain Response Report of 1996 identified large 
opportunities for supply chain savings available through addressing redundancies 
among stakeholders, lack of transparency, and ongoing issues with service levels 
(Consulting CSC 1996; Landry and Beaulieu 2013). Even though the report 
motivated many players in the healthcare supply chain to act, an update to the 
report 15 years later found little evidence of improvements in cost and quality. The 
follow-up report concluded that: "We do not know where the fundamental 
inefficiencies and associated costs subsist within this complex supply chain. We also 
do not know where the opportunities for the greatest increases in quality exist within 
the healthcare supply chain." (Nachtmann and Pohl 2009, 2). 
These challenges have persisted in healthcare supply chains for decades, and one 
of the responses in the 1970’s was to centralize purchasing and materials 
management across the enterprise through shared service organizations (Griffin and 
Adams 1981; Mason 1979). However, many of the challenges faced by shared 
service organizations (SSOs) in that period (as identified by Griffin and Adams 
1981), such as difficulty in quantifying cost savings, issues with supplier selection, 
and inability to standardize products, are still considered top priorities in the 
industry. It appeared that SSOs tackled symptoms of supply chain complexity, rather 
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than resolving the complexity itself. SSO performance has also been constrained by 
its lack of influence on major policy decisions and the historically limited attention 
senior management has given to supply chain (purchasing in particular) in many 
industries, including healthcare (Bales and Fearson 1993; Landry and Beaulieu 2013; 
Markham and Lomas 1995). 
A new type of centralized distribution organization, the consolidated service 
center (CSC), has since emerged to address the complexity in healthcare supply 
chains.  CSCs are a form of shared service organizations that service multiple 
geographically dispersed organizations (Landry and Beaulieu 2013). Unlike many 
other centralization strategies, CSCs do not heavily concern themselves with 
achieving significant economies of scale to drive higher performance. Instead, they 
have the potential to drive performance by way of supply chain complexity reduction, 
through supply base rationalization and disintermediation. 
The specific form of the CSC can be characterized as both emergent and 
contingent, since an organization’s history and setting influence the specific structure 
of the CSC. For example, some CSCs emerged as departments within individual 
healthcare systems while others were formed as joint ventures between independent 
systems. A Gartner report identified various structures of CSCs and predicted that 
such organizations will only grow in numbers to represent 15% to 20% of the total 
healthcare supply market from a revenue perspective (O’Daffer and Mooraj 2011). 
This research attempts to explore how CSCs improve the management of 
complex hospital-based supply chains. To frame this research, we conceptualize 
hospital supply chains as complex systems. A complex system, as defined by the 
complexity science discipline, is a system having numerous components that are 
interrelated (Simon 1962). Both healthcare systems and supply chains have been 
conceptualized using this framework (Begun, Zimmerman, and Dooley 2003; Choi, 
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Dooley, and Rungtusanatham 2001; Kannampallil et al. 2011; McDaniel, Lanham, 
and Anderson 2009). Building upon this stream of work, we examine the role of 
CSCs from the perspective of a hospital’s complex supply chain, and how it impacts 
the components and interrelatedness in that system. Our research questions address 
the future research calls laid out in Landry and Beaulieu (2013), which seek to 
understand the role of CSCs in improving healthcare supply chain performance in 
healthcare: 
“The emergence of centralized distribution platforms also generates 
interesting research possibilities. For example, does a better model exist 
between shared services and third party logistics (3PL) providers, or 
under what conditions should one or the other organizational mode or 
governance structure be selected? Does a third option exist? Given the 
emergence of distribution platforms, which often are region-wide, what 
impact might these platforms have on upstream partners in the supply 
chain, primarily GPOs [group purchasing organizations] and distributors?” 
(Landry and Beaulieu 2013, 480). 
We approach these questions through a case study methodology and investigate 
three CSCs to understand their emergence and how they have improved supply 
chain performance of the hospitals they served. First, we observe similar 
characteristics of CSCs across our three cases that distinguished them from other 
distribution platforms. We find that the CSCs reduce complexity in the system 
through (1) supply base reduction, which reduces the number of components in the 
system and (2) hospital-supplier relationship management, which reduces the 
interrelatedness in the system. By reducing the supply chain complexity, CSCs have 
enabled hospitals to achieve higher levels of supply chain performance, in terms of 
the documented cost of operations. 
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The following section presents a literature review of complexity science, as it 
relates to complex systems and their characteristics, followed by our 
conceptualization of a hospital’s supply chain as a complex system. The methodology 
section follows, elaborating on case selection process, data collection, and analysis. 
Then, the three cases are first presented individually, describing each CSC and how it 
has impacted its customer hospitals. This is followed by a cross-case analysis. We 
conclude with a discussion of the findings, implications, and future research 
directions. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Complexity Science 
Complexity science is a multidisciplinary field that conceptualizes a wide variety 
of phenomena as complex systems (from flocking birds to chemical reactions to 
supply chains) providing a useful lens to understand the characteristics of these 
phenomena. It is applied in a variety of disciplines including physics, biology, 
computer science, and sociology. Entire journals dedicated to research and 
applications in complexity science have also emerged (e.g. Journal of Complexity, 
Complexity). Complexity science has proven to be a potent framework for 
organizational science, applied in strategic management (Levinthal and Warglien 
1999), economics (Kauffman and Macready 1995), supply chain management (Choi, 
Dooley, and Rungtusanatham 2001), and healthcare management (Begun, 
Zimmerman, and Dooley 2003). 
In complexity science, a complex system is defined by the number of 
components in the system and the interrelatedness of these components (Simon 
1962). This definition is also congruent with the NK model, where N and K represent 
the number of components and interrelatedness, respectively (Kauffman and Levin 
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1987). Depending on the context and level of analysis, a component can be 
operationalized as an individual, an inanimate object, a department, or an 
organization that acts autonomously and interacts with other components. The 
interrelatedness between components refers to the influence components can have 
on one another. While there have been many extensions and variants to this basic 
definition of complexity, Simon's definition continues to be the most prominent in the 
social sciences and is still applied in recent complexity research (e.g., Kannampallil 
et al. 2011; Kim, Chen, and Linderman 2015). 
A complex system can be visualized as a "fitness landscape" with hills and valleys 
that represent varying degrees of performance outcomes (Kauffman and Levin 
1987). A simple system—with a small number of components and low degree of 
interrelatedness—represents a smooth landscape where it is easy to identify and 
move towards the highest peak. The higher the degree of interrelatedness between 
the components of a system, the more rugged the landscape becomes and the more 
demanding it becomes to identify and reach the peak. Hence, reducing the number 
of components in the complex system and the degree of interrelatedness among 
components simplifies the landscape such that high levels of operating performance 
can be more easily pursued (Levinthal 1997; Levinthal and Warglien 1999). This 
representation of complex systems was originally devised in the context of 
evolutionary biology (Kauffman and Weinberger 1989; Kauffman and Levin 1987), 
but has since been applied to many other areas including organizational theory and 
supply chain management (Choi, Dooley, and Rungtusanatham 2001; Choi and 
Krause 2006; Kim, Chen, and Linderman 2015; Matos and Hall 2007). 
A signature feature of complex systems that has motivated researchers in many 
different fields to apply complexity science is emergence. Emergence is when the 
interrelationships between components lead to self-organizing patterns (Goldstein 
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2000). The flocking of birds or social structures in ant colonies are classic examples 
of self-organizing behaviors (Sigmund 1993) while the “invisible hand of the market” 
is another example of self-organizing behavior in economics (Dodder and Dare 
2000). Supply chains are also considered to show emergent behavior when 
“individual firms partake in the grand establishment of the supply network by 
engaging in their localized decision-making.” (Choi, Dooley, and Rungtusanatham 
2001, 358). 
Healthcare Supply Chains as Complex Systems 
In the healthcare supply chain systems studied here, the system is viewed from 
the perspective of a hospital. Components around the focal hospital include its 
suppliers, GPOs, distributors, parent corporation, sister hospitals, and the CSC. 
These components interrelate with the focal hospital (and with each other) in 
multiple ways. For example, suppliers may be connected with a hospital through 
direct sourcing contracts or through contracts mediated by GPOs. Similarly, 
interrelatedness is present in the storage and physical distribution of supplies, which 
is often mediated by distributors. Interrelatedness may also occur between the focal 
hospital and other hospitals in its network. In complex systems, it is acceptable that 
independent components demonstrate correlated behavior (Kannampallil et al. 
2011). Such is the case for hospitals operating under centralized systems or 
alliances. This does not compromise the independence of the hospitals, which 
continue to operate under independent operating licenses (Bazzoli et al. 2004). In 
terms of supply chain activities, hospitals (even ones in centralized systems) most 
often have a Supply Chain Director (or Director of Materials Management) who has 
some level of decision-making autonomy at the hospital-level, to be able to respond 
to local needs.  
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Thus, a hospital’s supply chain can be described as a complex system with many 
components and a high level of interrelatedness between them (as we illustrate in 
Figure 2). Rivard-Royard et al. (2002, 413) present a similar conceptualization of 
complexity in healthcare "which results on the one hand from the multitude of 
different supplies used by the institutions and the myriad distribution channels 
through which they flow". They present the healthcare supply chain as a complex 
system with numerous components (manufacturers, distributors and vendors) all 
interrelated as the supplies flow through them and into the hospital's internal chain. 
This complexity in healthcare supply chains is a consequence of several 
characteristics largely unique to the health sector. First, there is a high degree of 
heterogeneity in the departments and facilities within a hospital. Clinical departments 
such as emergency, cardiology, surgery, oncology, and laboratories (in addition to 
affiliated physicians’ offices and satellite facilities) all have differing materials 
requirements, many of which are critical for patient safety and public health (Beier 
1995; Landry and Beaulieu 2013). Second, there is a high level of product variety in 
healthcare, meaning that even for products that are common across multiple 
 
Figure 2. Components and interrelatedness in a hospital’s supply chain 
  9 
departments, each department or physician may prefer a different alternative 
(Schneller and Smeltzer 2006). Ongoing medical product innovations combined with 
differing rates of adoption further drives this diversity. From an information 
perspective, a universal coding system for the medical device industry is in its very 
early stages, making it difficult to identify equivalent products (The Brookings 
Institute 2015). Third, physicians play an important role in product and supplier 
selection because of their medical training and experience, particularly for the aptly 
labeled physician preference items (PPIs) (Chen, Preston, and Xia 2013; Roark 
2005). The professional power of physicians causes tension between them and 
organizational buyers (i.e. the hospital’s purchasing department), making it difficult 
for the hospital to address product standardization (Montgomery and Schneller 2007; 
Roark 2005). 
The sources of complexity discussed above result in a highly rugged landscape, 
with a large number of interrelated components. A hospital generally maintains a 
large supply base and many intermediaries in order to maintain high service levels, 
translating to a high number of components in the system. Many intermediaries, 
such as GPOs and distributors, become involved in the supplier-hospital interactions. 
In the United States, over 80% of hospitals source at least 50% of their commodity 
and pharmaceutical products through GPOs, and 41% of hospitals are affiliated with 
more than one GPO (L. R. Burns and Lee 2008). Adding to the complexity is the 
distributors' interrelatedness with this large supply base and the hospital. To add 
perspective to this matter, consider that a typical hospital owns about 35,000 SKUs, 
but only 6,000 to 8,000 are located at the hospital (Darling and Wise 2010). 
Healthcare supply chains also exhibit "emergent" characteristics. Landry and 
Beaulieu (2013, 470) describe the evolution of the health sector supply chain 
function as follows: "the emergence of the materials management or logistics 
  10 
department in its current form is the result of many changes that have taken place 
over a 100-year period within the hospital environment [emphasis added]". The 
emergence and ongoing evolution of GPOs for many decades is another example (M. 
D. Thill 1989). More recently, the emergence of CSCs in a few healthcare supply 
chains has sparked a huge discussion in the industry about "self-distribution" (Brooks 
2015; Health Industry Distributors Association 2012; M. Thill 2012; O’Daffer and 
Mooraj 2011). The CSCs that emerged in various regions of the United States have 
different governance structures and growth trajectories while exhibiting some 
universal features, which this research attempts to uncover.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
To address our research questions, we adopted a qualitative approach to allow 
for a deep, yet flexible exploration of the role of CSCs. We followed guidance from 
Ellram (1996) and Miles and Huberman (1994) in conducting the research, and 
Fawcett et al.'s (2014) "trail guide" for articulating the analysis and findings. In this 
section, we will discuss our sample, data collection process, and the data analysis 
process. 
Sample 
To understand the effect of a CSC on a hospital's supply chain, we investigated 
three different CSCs and considered how the supply chains of their customer 
hospitals changed after the CSC intervention. A theoretical sampling approach was 
taken to select three cases with CSC interventions to be examined in detail (Barratt, 
Choi, and Li 2011; Eisenhardt 1989b). A theoretical sampling approach implies that 
the cases to be studied were deliberately chosen (rather than randomly sampled) to 
maximize the potential for gaining useful insights out of them. First, we identified 
eleven prominent CSCs based on media articles, conferences, and reports (e.g., 
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Health Industry Distributors Association 2012; M. Thill 2012; O’Daffer and Mooraj 
2011). We further restricted this sample to make it feasible to hold face-to-face 
interviews with the stakeholders and conduct site visits in each of the cases. We 
chose to examine CSCs of different types to examine how different governance 
models emerge and what their influence was on supply chain operations. The second 
selection criterion was to have CSCs that were mature organizations of significant 
size. This criterion provides us assurance that any effects CSCs have had on 
hospitals are long-term and sustainable, as well as providing a longer history to 
examine.  
The pseudonyms Alpha, Beta, and Gamma are used to refer to the three CSCs in 
the selected cases. Each of the three CSCs in our study has operated for more than 
ten years and serves, at least, seven acute-care hospitals. They differed on 
governance structure and ownership status. Alpha was established as a joint venture 
between two independent healthcare systems and acts as a stand-alone entity that 
serves external customers. Beta operates within the bounds of a single healthcare 
system, acting as a cost center. Finally, Gamma started operations as an internal 
supply chain division to a healthcare system (like Beta), but later expanded into a 
profit center that serves hospitals in its parent healthcare system as well as external 
customers. 
Data Collection and Sources  
Primary data was collected in 2013 through semi-structured interviews with 
multiple respondents in each of the three cases. An interview instrument was used to 
guide the interview, but the questioning was not limited to the interview protocol, 
and issues were raised and discussed based on observations or previous responses. 
In all cases, multiple key executives of the CSC were interviewed (i.e. CEO, COO, 
CFO, Vice President etc.). In two of the cases (Alpha and Gamma), CEOs of hospitals 
  12 
being served by the CSCs were also interviewed, to get their perspective of supply 
chain complexity and the CSC’s role over the years. Twelve interviews were 
conducted across the three cases, each lasting one hour or longer. All but one of the 
interviews was face-to-face (one interview was conducted via teleconference), with 
two researchers present during the interviews. Onsite tours of the CSCs' organization 
and warehouses were conducted as well, gaining first-hand observations of some of 
their distribution and operations processes. 
Documents, such as reports and presentations about the services, performance, 
and history of the CSCs were also gathered and reviewed. In addition to publically 
available information, some documents were collected before the site visits to help 
enrich the interview discussions, while others were obtained as a result of requests 
for more information based on interview outcomes. Subsequent to the site visits and 
interviews, we sent out a short questionnaire to the leader of each CSC to verify 
some of our findings and fill in gaps in our data. 
Coding and Data Analysis 
Our investigation generated a large amount of data from semi-structured 
interviews, supplementary materials, publically available information, and first-hand 
observations from the site visits. Throughout the collection process, the data was 
organized and coded to draw out coherent constructs and relationships (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). During the first several iterations, the data was coded based on 
constructs drawn from our theoretical framework (number of components, 
interrelatedness, rugged landscapes, emergence, etc.). From the discussions among 
the research team, additional themes began to materialize, which triggered a 
process of revisiting data and applying additional codes. We mapped these emerging 
constructs back to our theoretical framework, assessing whether the data supported, 
contradicted, or extended our preconceived understanding of this phenomenon. 
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After several coding iterations, the emphasis was shifted from data probing 
towards a cross-case analysis to help bring cohesion between the observed 
 
Table 2. Case Observations 
 Case 1: Alpha Case 2: Beta Case 3: Gamma 
Year CSC was Initiated 1998 2002 2000 
Region Served Southeast U.S. Southwest U.S. Midwest U.S. 
Governance Model 
Joint Venture (serves 
external customers) 
Cost Center (serves 
internal customers 
only) 
Profit Center (internal 
& external customers) 
Number of Acute-care 
Hospitals Served 
7 Hospitals 
(95% of total revenue) 
14 Hospitals 
(80% of total revenue) 
71 Hospitals 
(61% of total revenue) 
Number of Supplier 
Contracts 
300 contracts 111 contracts Over 1,000 contracts 
Number of Product 
SKUs Managed 
4,500 SKUs 2,100 SKUs Over 100,000 SKUs 
Supply Chain IT 
Integration 
Develops software 
interfaces to connect 
with the different 
systems of customers 
Integrated ERP system 
across the managed 
customer base 
Integrated ERP system 
across the managed  
customer base 
Purchasing 
Direct Sourcing, 
CSC is also a GPO 
~50% Direct Sourcing, 
~50% through 
National GPO 
Direct Sourcing, 
CSC is also a GPO 
Warehousing / 
Inventory 
Management 
Central warehouse 
serves hospitals in 
multiple states 
Central warehouse 
serves one metro area 
Two central 
warehouses, serves 
hospitals in multiple 
states 
Outbound 
Transportation (from 
CSC to hospitals) 
Owns and operates a 
trucking fleet 
Outsourced to 3rd 
party logistics 
provider 
Owns and operates a 
trucking fleet  
Examples of 
manufacturing-type 
services managed by 
the CSC 
Surgical Packs, 
Pharma Repackaging, 
IV Compounding, 
Food Preparation, 
Sterilization, 
Instrument Repair 
Surgical Packs, 
Drug Compounding, 
IV Packing, 
Pharma Repackaging 
Self-branded products, 
Surgical Packs, 
Pharma Repackaging, 
IV Compounding, 
Printing Services, 
Instrument Repair 
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constructs and relationships in each case. Where there were gaps or inconsistencies 
between cases, we attempted to identify the potential sources of variance that may 
have resulted in such deviations. This process facilitated the development and 
iterative refinement of testable propositions. 
 
WITHIN CASE ANALYSIS 
In this section, we discuss each case in terms of the history, structure, and 
operations of the CSC. The role of the CSC in a hospital’s supply chain is also 
described based on the perspective of both the CSCs and the customers that were 
interviewed. Additional information about the three CSCs is summarized Table 2. 
Case 1: Alpha  
Alpha is a CSC that operates as an independent, non-profit organization. It was 
founded in 1998 by two small healthcare systems (totaling four hospitals) in the 
Southeastern region of the United States. Several environmental factors, including 
profitability pressures and limited strategic control over procurement, motivated the 
CEOs of the two healthcare systems to establish the CSC. At the time of our 
interviews, Alpha served seven acute-care hospitals, which account for 95% of its 
total revenue. Alpha operates a "membership model", where all member hospitals 
(i.e. customers) are considered external customers and are charged cost plus a fixed 
markup on all supplies and services. The materials management director (typically 
the highest supply chain authority) at each member hospital reports to Alpha's 
executive team. 
Alpha initially started with purchasing activities, providing value to member 
hospitals by negotiating purchasing contracts with better terms than the general 
contracts offered through national GPOs. Soon after, Alpha established a centralized 
warehouse with logistics operations to better support the direct relationships with 
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suppliers. As the CSC matured, it extended additional service offerings to its member 
hospitals. In addition to contracting, distribution, and logistics services, the 
additional services included pharmaceutical repackaging, custom surgical pack 
assembly1, medical instrument repairs, IV (intravenous) therapy bag mixing service, 
and food preparation. 
When receiving Alpha's services, a hospital's supply chain changes in a number of 
ways. The most pronounced change is the significant decrease in the number of 
contracts negotiated at the hospital level. A large majority of the hospital's 
purchasing transactions get routed and fulfilled directly through Alpha, eliminating 
much of the interrelatedness that was previously required in the supply chain. This 
also allows Alpha to largely displace the hospital's national GPO and distributors. The 
high level of purchasing being routed through Alpha is achieved by aligning supply 
chain governance between the hospital and Alpha, i.e. having the hospital's supply 
chain authority report to Alpha's leadership rather than the hospital's CEO. 
The hospital's supply base is further reduced through product standardization, 
driven by Alpha's "value analysis teams" and demand aggregation efforts across 
different departments and hospitals in the systems they serve. For example, Alpha's 
standardization effort cut the number of different orthopedic implantable medical 
devices sourced from different suppliers by more than half. Physician preference 
items, such as orthopedic implants, are known to be among the hardest medical 
products to standardize (Montgomery and Schneller 2007). Alpha successfully 
influenced its member hospitals to limit the number of product alternatives available 
to their surgeons. The additional manufacturing-type services provided by Alpha also 
reduce the hospital’s need to engage with third-party service providers. A reduction 
                                           
1 Surgical packs are packaged bundles of surgical instruments put together for a 
specific type of surgical procedure. The CSC customizes the surgical packs to the 
specifications of the physician that requests it. 
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in the number of suppliers and 3PLs for the hospital translates to a reduction in the 
number of components in the complex system. 
Case 2: Beta 
Beta operates within the boundaries of a single healthcare system located in the 
Southwestern region of the United States. In the late 1990's, a merger between two 
healthcare systems led to organizational restructuring, which also resulted in 
establishing a CSC (Beta) to focus on the supply chain functions of the hospitals. 
Beta serves hospitals (and other clinical facilities) within the parent healthcare 
system with no immediate intentions of serving hospitals from other healthcare 
systems. In that regard, Beta resembles a shared service organization, but with two 
key distinctions from "traditional" SSOs (e.g., Griffin and Adams 1981; Mason 1979). 
SSOs generally serve multiple information-intensive functions (e.g. Finance, HR, IT), 
with supply chain being the least common function served by SSOs (Deloitte 2013). 
Conversely, Beta’s prime focus is on supply chain services (the same is also true for 
Gamma and Alpha). Second, the reporting structure between hospitals and Beta is 
tightly integrated, giving Beta a much higher degree of control over supply chain 
activities than is typically observed with SSOs in healthcare (Markham and Lomas 
1995). The directors of materials management at the hospitals report to the CSC's 
leadership, who in turn report to leadership at the parent healthcare system. 
With regards to purchasing, Beta manages purchasing for 14 acute-care 
hospitals. Beta uses GPOs for about 50% of its total spend, particularly for 
commodity-type items. It was explained that "GPOs still do a good job negotiating 
commodity items for us… GPOs have a hard time in controlling [member use of 
contracts for] PPIs.” In terms of distribution services, Beta operates a warehouse 
that serves a smaller subset of hospitals that are within a feasible proximity to the 
warehouse. Beta cited two advantages of operating its own centralized warehouse. 
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First, the central warehouse provides a platform to host additional supply chain 
support services such as repackaging products into low units of measure, surgical 
pack assembly, and pharmaceutical compounding. Second, Beta can directly 
negotiate and receive products from some suppliers, which improves contract 
compliance with those suppliers. From a supplier’s perspective, contracting and 
fulfilling orders directly to Beta reduces both the payment cycles and risk for 
suppliers (relative to consignment structures with distributors).  
Beta also promotes product standardization by working closely with value 
analysis teams (sometimes referred to as "clinical consensus teams") representing 
physicians, nurses, and procurement officers. These teams systematically target 
product categories with high volume and total cost, to reduce the number of product 
alternatives being sourced and focus on negotiating more cost-effective contracts 
with fewer suppliers. The team assesses all the current alternatives based on price, 
volume, effectiveness, and supplier support. For commodity products, value analysis 
teams reduce product alternatives down to between one to three choices, and are 
generally fulfilled through GPO-negotiated contracts. With physician preference 
items, the product alternatives are typically reduced from over ten product choices to 
four or five, satisfying the significant majority of stakeholders. Product 
standardization naturally leads to supply base reduction for a hospital, translating to 
fewer components in the system, and more focused contracting efforts that yield 
higher value. The CSC is more successful in product standardization than attempts to 
do so during the previous operating structure of the system, because the CSC is able 
to better coordinate value analysis teams with its downstream customers and at the 
same time implement change upstream, with the suppliers. 
Case 3: Gamma 
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Gamma is a CSC that emerged from restructuring efforts at a large healthcare 
system in the Midwest. Prior to the restructuring, the state of supply chain 
operations at the hospitals within the system was described as having a high level of 
complexity and no strategic focus. Purchasing and inventory management processes 
were not well integrated nor standardized across the system’s hospitals. For 
example, the COO of the parent healthcare system described the purchasing process 
at one hospital when he first joined the organization (before Gamma was formed) as 
follows: “The hospital administration almost intentionally wanted the [purchasing] 
process to be slow, to slow down the spending and prevent people from going on 
shopping sprees.” Upon its inception, Gamma first focused on integrating supply 
chain information systems across hospitals. This effort revealed many missed 
purchasing opportunities, such as identical items being purchased by sister hospitals 
at different unit prices. Gamma then expanded its scope to incorporate logistics and 
distribution services. 
In 2010, Gamma expanded beyond the confines of its parent health system and 
began offering their services to external hospitals and clinical facilities. About half of 
the acute-care hospitals served by Gamma belong to its parent healthcare system. 
However, the CSC is very selective in choosing its clients, as Gamma's CEO 
explained: “We are very picky when it comes to choosing customers…”, “[Gamma] 
goes through a rigorous screening process to ensure that the potential customer is 
willing to comply with our initiatives and expectations.” For example, Gamma 
integrates its customer's supply chain IT with its own to track the supply spend, and 
requires that customer hospitals maintain at least 80% contract compliance. This 
required level of compliance streamlines the purchasing process and significantly 
reduces the interrelatedness between the hospital and other actors such as suppliers 
and GPOs. Furthermore, the reporting structure for the hospital’s director of material 
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management changes to a matrix structure, where he must report to both Gamma in 
addition to the hospital’s leadership (similar to Alpha and Banner’s cases). 
Beyond purchasing and logistics services, Gamma provides hospitals with a wide 
array of other supply chain services and products. Of our three case examples, 
Gamma demonstrated the largest portfolio of services provided to customers. For 
example, Gamma provides a private label portfolio of clinical products with more 
than 1,000 SKUs, and continues to push for more: “We started by manufacturing 
garbage bags, now we are manufacturing medical devices.” These factors shrink a 
hospital's supply base and disintermediate some of the 3PLs, translating to less 
components in a hospital's supply chain system. In summary, Gamma significantly 
reduces a hospital supply chain’s number of intermediaries and suppliers through 
product standardization and by insourcing many functions and products. 
Summary 
Figure 3 provides a simple illustration of how CSCs in our three cases influence 
the supply chain network from the perspective of a hospital. In the first case, Alpha 
significantly reduced the interrelatedness between the hospital and its suppliers, 
while also reducing the supply base. Beta (Case 2) works with a national GPO and 
distributor rather than have the hospital interface with these entities. Beta also 
works closely with the parent health system and value analysis teams of the different 
clinical specialties to increase product and process standardization. In Case 3, 
Gamma has insourced multiple supply chain functions including assembly and 
manufacturing of some commodity products. Similar to the other two CSCs, Gamma 
also focused on supply base reduction and disintermediation for its customer 
hospitals. 
As seen in Table 2, the scope of supply chain functions at Alpha and Gamma is 
greater than Beta. Both Gamma and Alpha operate as GPOs while Beta continues to 
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work with a national GPO. At the time of our study, Beta did not operate its own 
trucking fleet like Alpha and Gamma, but rather outsourced it to a distributor. Alpha 
and Gamma also demonstrated a wider scope of manufacturing-type services 
compared to Beta. Gamma is significantly larger than Alpha and Beta in terms of 
hospitals served, contracts, and SKUs and also operates two centralized warehouses. 
Gamma also serves a much wider range of facilities, with acute-care hospitals 
accounting for 61% of its revenue, compared to 95% and 80% for Alpha and Beta 
respectively. 
Finally, to verify our observations about the CSCs' ability to reduce the 
complexity in a hospital's supply chain, we asked the leaders of the CSCs to estimate 
their impact on a hypothetical customer's supply chain landscape (Table 3). We 
asked about the reduction in the number of suppliers to gauge the reduction in the 
number of components in this complex system. The reduction in direct hospital-
supplier contracts was used as a proxy for interrelatedness reduction. Responses to 
these questions were provided by the leader of each CSC almost a year after our 
face-to-face interviews as a verification tool. The results from this verification are 
discussed in more detail in following sections. 
 
Figure 3. Hospital’s supply chain network after the CSC intervention 
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CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
Several interesting commonalities characterize all three CSCs and differentiate 
them from other centralized distribution platforms, such as shared service 
organizations. Three characteristics, in particular, were repeatedly observed 
throughout our interviews across all three cases and were important for the CSCs to 
effectively manage supply chain complexity. Appendix A presents proof quotes that 
support our observations regarding characteristics of CSCs and their role in reducing 
supply chain complexity. 
Selectivity of New Customers 
All three CSCs were very cautious about expanding their customer base. It is 
worth noting that we entered this study expecting economies of scale to be crucial to 
the success of CSCs. Many industries achieve economies of scale through increasing 
volume and customer-base (Chandler 1994), whereas CSCs were not concerned 
about increasing their customer base to improve their scale advantage. This was 
stated more than once in each of the three cases with comments like: "National 
distributors have the scale and talent, but we have the trust from both upstream and 
downstream [the suppliers and the hospital]", "suppliers do not penalize [Beta] for 
Table 3. CSC's impact on a hospital's supply chain complexity 
Suppose a 500-bed hospital enrolls as a new customer to your CSC (previously having a “traditional” 
SC operating model including a mix of GPO and self-initiated contracts).  How do you expect the 
hospital’s supply chain landscape to change one year after you take over their SC operations? 
 Alpha Beta Gamma 
a. Percentage reduction in total 
number of med/surg. suppliers: 
Reduced by 10 % Reduced by 20% Reduced by 10 % 
b. Percentage reduction of med/surg. 
direct contracts (non GPO). 
Reduced by 90 % Reduced by 10% Reduced by 50-75% 
c. Expected reduction in FTEs at the 
hospital  
   5+ FTEs  15   FTEs  3   FTEs 
d. Expected additional FTEs needed 
at CSC to service the hospital 
  2 FTEs    8 FTEs  1   FTEs 
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smaller orders compared to a distributor’s economies of scale," and "We run a very 
different model from the national distributors.”  
CSCs did increase their economies of scale by increasing volume with their 
existing customers but were judicious about increasing their customer base. Upon a 
deeper search in the healthcare management literature, we found that this strategy 
aligns with research that has looked at economies of scale in the health sector and 
concluded that: "economies are achieved at low rather than high levels of hospital 
scale, with more modest cost savings" (Alexander, Halpern, and Lee 1996; L. R. 
Burns and Pauly 2002, 132; Dranove 1998; Dranove and Shanley 1995).  
 Executives at Alpha and Gamma discussed a rigorous process in selecting 
prospective customers. Alpha emphasized that they do not have a sales or marketing 
department to reach out to potential customers. Even with its current size of over 70 
hospitals, Gamma's rigorous customer selection process was clearly articulated. For 
prospective customers that sought Gamma’s services but were not deemed to be an 
adequate "fit" by Gamma, they were presented with the option to receive consulting 
services from Gamma instead. In Beta’s case, there were simply no aspirations to 
serve customers outside the boundaries of its parent healthcare system. 
The high selectivity of the customer base in all three CSCs also reflects on the 
relatively limited regions that each CSC serves when compared to GPOs, national 
distributors, and even shared services organizations, who all typically provide nation-
wide services (L. Burns and Yovovich 2014; Deloitte 2013). 
Enforcing High Contract Compliance 
In the context of healthcare purchasing, contract compliance relates to how well 
the buyer lives up to its negotiated commitments on volume and market share that 
were the basis of the contract agreement. Previous research has shown that 
hospitals source about 50% of their commodity and pharmaceutical products through 
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GPO contracts, and only about 30% of physician preference items and capital items 
(L. R. Burns and Lee 2008; L. Burns and Yovovich 2014). In contrast to these 
statistics, our observations showed that over 80% of hospital supply spend goes 
through the CSC, in all three cases. In fact, with Alpha and Gamma, a critical clause 
in their contract agreements with customers is that the customer must maintain a 
certain level of contract compliance. This is enforced by monitoring the hospital's 
supply spend activity. Beta manages contract compliance issues through the chain of 
command within its healthcare system. 
Higher contract compliance encourages long-term partnerships (Doucette 1997), 
and reduces demand uncertainty for suppliers, which translates into a willingness to 
offer better prices (L. R. Burns and Lee 2008). Contract compliance motivates 
suppliers to have a close working relationship with the CSC, rather than sell through 
GPO contracts or promote their products directly to physicians. With high contract 
compliance, the CSC is able to follow through in purchasing the negotiated volume, 
offering suppliers more predictable delivery and payment scheduling cycles.  
All three CSCs integrated the reporting structure with the hospitals they served 
such that the reporting structure for the highest supply chain authority at each 
hospital changed to a matrix structure that included reporting to CSC leadership in 
addition to the hospital’s CEO. Interestingly, this modified reporting structure was 
not planned at the onset of any of the three CSCs' establishment but was an 
emergent adjustment in response to the resistance from materials management 
departments at the hospitals against the CSC's complexity reduction efforts. The 
challenges in implementing this reporting structure modification was discussed in 
depth in Alpha’s case. A CEO of one of Alpha's customers admitted to a significant 
pushback from materials management directors, some of whom opted to leave their 
position rather than yield to this reporting structure. Today, prospective customers 
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entering into agreements with Alpha (and Gamma) must fully agree to this condition 
in order to be served. 
Managing Supply Chain Complexity 
The aforementioned characteristics allow the CSCs to orchestrate the hospitals’ 
complex supply chain systems in ways that result in reduced complexity and lead to 
higher supply chain performance for the hospitals. CSCs reduce the number of 
components and reduce the interrelatedness among the remaining components in 
the complex system. The reduction in the number of components is largely conveyed 
through supply base reduction efforts. Reduction of interrelatedness is demonstrated 
with the role of the CSC as a centralized distribution hub, by both disintermediating 
third parties as well as managing the direct relationships between hospitals and 
suppliers. 
Supply base reduction. A prominent objective for all three CSCs is to reduce the 
supply base of the customers they serve. CSCs are heavily involved with value 
analysis teams, which usually consist of stakeholders (namely physicians, nurses and 
purchasing managers) that examine product options in a category and agree to 
reduce the number alternatives to be sourced. Multiple interviewees reaffirmed the 
idea that physicians have traditionally had the discretion and power to choose almost 
any product brand they preferred, leading the healthcare system to source up to ten 
different brands for essentially the same product (Montgomery and Schneller 2007). 
Unsurprisingly, the introduction of product standardization was initially received with 
heavy resistance from the physicians. This resistance was overcome by ensuring the 
adequate representation of physicians in the value analysis teams and providing 
scientific evidence of the equivalency of the clinical outcomes (or as one interviewee 
put it simply: "Overwhelm them with data"). Furthermore, value analysis teams in 
these arrangements combined stakeholders from multiple hospitals, providing a 
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larger pool of intelligence and experiences to draw from. This observation is 
consistent with the findings from a previous study that looked at strategies for 
sourcing physician preference items (Montgomery and Schneller 2007). 
In all three cases, the CSCs facilitated a significant reduction in the number of 
suppliers, with no indication of compromising clinical processes or quality. This 
finding is validated through Question A in Table 3. Beta provided the highest 
estimate for supply base reduction, possibly because all hospitals operate within a 
single healthcare system, and, therefore, standardization initiatives are supported 
directly by both the CSC and clinical leadership at the system level.  
Proposition 1: The CSC reduces the number of components in the hospital supply 
chain by facilitating supply base reduction initiatives for the hospital. 
Disintermediation 
In all of our cases, CSCs reduced the interrelatedness in the complex system. For 
hospitals served by Alpha and Gamma, the role of the national GPO and distributor 
was replaced by the CSC. While Beta did not replace the existing GPO and 
distributor, it serves as a mediator between them and the hospitals. Beta is also 
gradually moving towards shrinking their dependence on these third parties. Not only 
did this free up resources for the hospital (Table 3, Question C), it also significantly 
reduced the number of interactions with suppliers and other third parties that the 
hospital previously had to manage directly. 
The CSCs also mediated direct relationships between hospitals and suppliers. In a 
traditional supply chain operating model in this context, direct contracts with 
suppliers generally account for about half of a hospital's total supply spend (L. R. 
Burns and Lee 2008; L. Burns and Yovovich 2014). Many of these direct hospital-
supplier relationships are likely to be driven by physician relationships with supplier 
representatives, thus amplifying the level of interrelatedness in the system. By 
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acting as an intermediary, the CSC replaces these multiple relationships with a single 
point of contact and allows for demand aggregation to negotiate better contracts and 
enforce contract compliance. 
These observations are validated by the responses provided in Question B in 
Table 3, where the CSCs estimated that they are able to significantly reduce the 
number of direct contracts between a customer hospital and suppliers within the first 
year of serving a hospital. What stands out is Alpha's high estimate, which is 
partially explained by Alpha's full discretion in selecting customers (i.e. no 
obligations to serve hospitals in a parent healthcare system like Gamma or Beta), 
and opting only to pursue compliant customers that are willing to undergo drastic 
changes early in the process. Beta, on the other hand, estimated less of a reduction 
within the first year than either Alpha or Gamma. While the observed variance in 
provided estimates certainly stands as a future research issue, there is little question 
that CSCs reduce the interrelatedness in the supply chain. 
Proposition 2: The CSC reduces the interrelatedness in the hospital’s supply chain 
by disintermediating GPOs and national distributors, while managing hospital-
supplier relationships. 
 
DISCUSSION 
All three CSCs discussed the need for a clear integration strategy to be able to 
manage supply chain complexity on behalf of hospitals. The "rigorous screening 
process" during customer selection ensures that customers willingly align themselves 
with the CSC, which includes reorganizing their internal supply chain reporting 
structure. Accordingly, the modified reporting structure allows the CSC to actively 
orchestrate the hospital's supply chain and reduce the number of components and 
interrelatedness in a hospital's supply network. This orchestration allows the CSC to 
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enforce a high level of contract compliance with suppliers, which translates to better 
outcomes for both suppliers and hospitals. Viewed in this light, it makes sense that 
the need to realign the reporting structure had emerged in all three cases to 
complement the other key success factors. 
Taken together, these characteristics distinguish the operating model of CSCs 
from national distributors and traditional SSOs. Outsourcing of supply chain services 
(as typically seen when hospitals work with national distributors) provides supply 
chain specialization and economies of scale for the distributor but often fails to 
reduce the hospital’s supply chain complexity. From the hospital’s perspective, the 
distributor becomes one of many components in the complex system, with limited 
influence over actors in that system (such as physician-influenced direct contracts). 
Insourcing, through a shared service strategy, does not typically provide the 
necessary supply chain expertise, and SSOs in the health sector have traditionally 
struggled to achieve product standardization, and the necessary stakeholder buy-in 
to reduce complexity (Griffin and Adams 1981). Even contemporary spin-offs of the 
shared services concept in the health sector, such "Integrated Delivery System" 
structures, had largely failed to achieve substantial cost savings (Bazzoli et al. 2004; 
L. R. Burns and Pauly 2002). Therefore, we strongly subscribe to Landry and 
Beaulieu's (2013) notion of a "third option" between 3PLs (outsourcing) and shared 
services (insourcing). Alternatively, CSCs that have emerged in healthcare can be 
thought of as an "internal outsourcing" strategy (Aksin and Masini 2008). 
The CSCs’ ability to develop service and process innovations is a major source of 
value for their customers, and was a recurring topic of discussion in our interviews. 
On multiple occasions, the CEO of Alpha described his organization as a “supply 
chain think tank”. Alpha demonstrated a strong entrepreneurial culture across 
multiple layers of the organization. Executives and managers were encouraged to 
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propose and champion projects they were passionate about. Similarly, the CEO of 
Gamma’s parent organization stated that, “I would be disappointed if a year went by 
and there wasn’t a major innovation introduced by [Gamma]”. Innovation can be 
gauged by the additional services that the CSCs have developed for hospitals (often 
proactively rather than responding to customer demands) that organically emerge 
over time to capitalize on supply chain opportunities. 
Another common thread across the three cases was the strong leadership teams 
that operate the CSCs. From our observations, we can hypothesize that 
“transformational leadership” (Bass et al. 2003) is a necessary condition to 
successfully deploy a CSC strategy. This observation is also consistent with findings 
from previous research showing that transformational leadership moderates the role 
between buying centers (which resemble CSCs in structure and function) and supply 
chain performance (Hult, Ketchen, and Chabowski 2007). 
Proof quotes about innovation and transformational leadership are provided in 
Appendix A. The complexity reduction, along with innovation and transformational 
leadership, lead to achievements well beyond cost reduction (O’Daffer and Mooraj 
2011). 
Study Limitations 
As with any research effort, this study is not without limitations. First, our 
theoretical sampling approach was both a source of strength and weakness. Since 
our theoretical sample focused on mature and successful CSCs, we could not directly 
compare outcomes of this strategy against alternative distribution models. We also 
did not examine hospitals that have considered a CSC strategy but found other 
strategies more suitable, or emulated some of the features of a CSC with their 
national distributor (e.g. Narayanan and Brem 2009). In addition to comparing 
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multiple supply chain strategies, future studies may want to examine cases of CSC 
implementations that have failed. 
This study did not have a strong financial focus to quantify cost savings from 
complexity reduction. Customers of CSCs only provided anecdotal evidence and 
general cost-savings estimates related to the success of CSC initiatives. There is 
ample opportunity to conduct quantitative studies on the effectiveness of different 
distribution models (or different types of CSCs), either as a cross-sectional or 
longitudinal study. Such effort may begin to explain the variance of the estimates in 
Table 3 regarding reduction in supply base and contracts. A larger sample can better 
generalize the impact of a CSC strategy.  
Another potential area of weakness in this study is the limited number of cases 
examined, which poses some risk to the external validity of the findings. However, 
Voss (2002) indicated the trade-off between the number of cases and the depth 
taken in each case. We believe that we have addressed each case with adequate 
depth: interviewing top-level CSC executives, onsite tours of the facilities, interviews 
with hospital CEOs, and post hoc validation of our observations (Table 3). We were 
also able to capture the longitudinal aspect of these organizations by interviewing co-
founders of all three CSCs. The emergence of similar themes across all three cases 
gave more credence to the external validity and generalizability of this study. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A hospital’s supply chain is a complex system with a large supply base and a high 
degree of interrelatedness between players. Different types of CSCs have emerged in 
a number of healthcare systems to manage the supply chain complexity, with the 
goal of more efficient and effective hospital performance. Conceptualizing hospital 
supply chains as complex systems provides a fitting framework to identify why CSCs 
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are able to effectively orchestrate this highly complex system beyond what other 
centralized operating models have been able to achieve. CSCs change the 
conversation by pursuing mechanisms for achieving supply chain effectiveness 
beyond the traditional economies of scale approach, which appears to have nuances 
in the health sector (L. R. Burns and Pauly 2002; Dranove 1998; Dranove and 
Shanley 1995). 
The CSC's positioning as an orchestrator of a hospital’s supply chain appears to 
alleviate many of the previously identified barriers to supply chain success (McKone-
Sweet, Hamilton, and Willis 2005). For example, barriers such as "conflicting 
incentives" and "inconsistent relationship with GPOs" were addressed by the inherent 
structure and mission of the CSC. The CSC addresses "lack of executive support" by 
having transformational leaders with direct authority over supply chain activities 
through the modified reporting structure. We found the CSCs to be centers for supply 
chain expertise and innovation, breaking the critical barrier of "limited education on 
supply chain" (McKone-Sweet, Hamilton, and Willis 2005), and solidifying their role 
as supply chain innovators. 
Lessons learned from healthcare CSCs hold out great promise for improved 
supply chain coordination and the management of complex systems in healthcare as 
well as other settings. The health sector’s supply chain, with its institutional reliance 
on GPOs and large distributors, provides a rich context to further understand the 
nature of CSCs and the evolving roles for GPOs and distributors who, themselves, 
have been honing their supply chain competencies for decades. Future research will 
be needed to better understand the prerequisites for establishing a CSC and how it 
compares to other operating models, with respect to sustaining high levels of service 
and innovation for healthcare. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MANAGING BUYER-SUPPLIER TRUST IN A MOST DISTRUSTING INDUSTRY 
 
ABSTRACT 
While buyer-supplier collaboration is widely recognized as a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage, the path to buyer-supplier trust remains elusive. This 
research examines factors that influence buyer-supplier trust in a supply chain 
context characterized by adversarial relationships and lack of trust among partners. 
Importantly, this research adds to the existing literature by examining both enablers 
(information sharing, contracts, and dedicated investment) as well as barriers 
(conflicting views and dependence) to buyer-supplier trust. Using structural equation 
modeling, the proposed trust model is applied to survey data from both buyers and 
suppliers in the healthcare industry. The findings reveal that while some of the 
constructs associated with trust are perceived in healthcare as they are in other 
contexts, some interesting nuances emerge. Dependence, although having a 
negative connotation to trust, becomes associated with a higher level of contracting, 
which in turn improves trusting relationships in the long-run. Furthermore, we find 
that dedicated resource investments by supply chain partners do not increase trust, 
and may in some cases act as a barrier to trust if ulterior motives, such as 
entrenchment and upselling, behind such investments are suspected. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Collaboration among supply chain partners has been recognized as a viable 
source of competitive advantage with substantial empirical support from the research 
community. Dyer and Singh's (1998) “relational view” provides a theoretical 
perspective on how buyer-supplier relationships provide a source of competitive 
advantage. They argue that with collaborative relationships generate relational rent 
by reducing transaction costs and stimulating innovation. Despite the potential 
benefits of supply chain collaboration, many organizations remain hesitant to make 
themselves vulnerable to the risks associated with collaborative supply chains. 
Furthermore, even when organizations have the intention to collaborate, these 
intentions fall short of achieving value for the partners due to the presence of 
relationship barriers or failure to transform collaborative efforts into mutual value 
(Fawcett and Magnan 2002; Frankel, Goldsby, and Whipple 2002). There continue to 
be questions about the extent to which relationship barriers undermine the influence 
relationship enablers and negate performance benefits accrued from collaboration.  
The struggle to realize value from collaborative relationships is particularly 
apparent in healthcare supply chains. The healthcare supply industry is characterized 
by the prevalence of adversarial relationships and low levels of trust between supply 
chain partners compared to other industries (Conway 2011; McKone-Sweet, 
Hamilton, and Willis 2005; Schneller and Smeltzer 2006). A survey by Gartner 
Research  reports that 93% of supply chain executives in healthcare perceive a lack 
of trust among trading partners (Dominy and O’Daffer 2011).  Several complexities 
in the health sector significantly influence buyer-supplier relationships. These 
complexities include regulatory pressures and reform policies, intensity of both 
knowledge and capital in the business, physician influence in supply selection, and 
the high level of supply chain intermediation. This study answers calls for more 
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context-specific research (Beckman and Sinha 2005) by examining relationship 
antecedents in a context that is distinctly different from other industries in terms of 
relationships and supply chain complexity (McKone-Sweet, Hamilton, and Willis 
2005). 
This paper attempts to extend previous research on buyer-supplier trust by 
assessing the combined effect and moderation of enablers and barriers in an industry 
that is known for a high level of distrust among supply chain partners. The three 
facilitators of trust to be examined are aligned with the relational view and include 
information sharing, dedicated resource investments, and contracts as a formal 
governance mechanism. The two barriers to trust to be examined are conflicting 
views and dependence. We develop our constructs and model based on previously 
used constructs and models, drawing mainly from the work of Nyaga et al. (2010), 
Handfield and Bechtel (2002), and Whipple et al. (2010). Finally, the similarity of our 
constructs and model with previous trust research allows for a comparison between 
our context-specific findings and findings from previous work that has captured trust 
perceptions from a more general sample of the population. 
This study provides several insights into the literature on buyer-supplier 
relationships. One significant finding is the role of contracting as a mediator between 
trust and dependence (Handfield and Bechtel 2002). This aligns with other research 
that has taken different approaches to examine the contracting-trust virtuous spiral 
(Autry and Golicic 2010; Cuevas, Julkunen, and Gabrielsson 2015). This study also 
sheds more light on the fickle perceptions of dedicated resource investments in the 
partnership. Our results suggest that, in a healthcare context, supply chain partners 
appear to be more cynical about dedicated resource investments compared to other 
contexts (e.g., Dyer 1996b).  A posthoc analysis suggests that from the buyers’ 
perspective, dedicated resource investments can hinder trust in certain situations, as 
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such investments by the supplier can be associated with supplier upselling and 
entrenchment (Robinson 2015). This observation is in agreement with the recent 
press in the healthcare industry about substituting supplier resources with internally 
developed capabilities or by receiving equivalent services from third-party providers 
(Lee 2014; Thill 2015). The findings in this paper demonstrate an interesting context 
and provide grounds for impactful research in the role of contracting in relationship 
governance (e.g., Katok and Pavlov 2013), and about the dark-side of supplier 
entrenchment that develops through excessive investment in buyer operations (e.g., 
Day et al. 2013). 
The next section provides the background literature to support our hypotheses 
and theoretical model. This is followed by the research methodology and data 
analysis. The managerial and theoretical implications of the findings are then 
discussed, and the paper closes with limitations and opportunities for future 
research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section will first discuss inter-organizational trust (with a focus on buyer-
supplier relationships), followed by a review of the positive antecedents considered 
in this study. This is followed by a discussion of distrust and the negative 
antecedents of trust. These antecedents are discussed with the healthcare context in 
mind. The key constructs employed in this study are summarized in Table 4. The 
references in the table refer to the works we have resorted to for developing the 
measurement scales. 
Trust 
Inter-organizational trust is an intensely studied topic in multiple disciplines including 
marketing, strategy, supply chain management, and organizational behavior. To a 
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large extent, trust research is developed through two perspectives: the social 
perspective and the economic perspective (Whipple, Griffis, and Daugherty 2013). 
The social perspective develops knowledge on trust through the social capital and 
relational embeddedness frameworks. Social Exchange Theory considers trust as a 
relational governance mechanism to achieve collaboration between two parties 
 
Table 4. Constructs used in the study 
Construct Definition Measurement Reference 
Trust 
A firm’s belief that the partner will act in 
the best interest of the firm and the 
relationship 
(Chen et al., 2013; Klein, 2007; 
Nyaga et al., 2010; Whipple et 
al., 2010) 
Performance 
The strategic-level performance of the 
focal firm, that is enabled by the 
relationship with the exchange partner 
(i.e. meeting the organization’s mission, 
financial and service effectiveness) 
(Corsten and Felde, 2005; 
Geiger et al., 2012; Richey et 
al., 2010; Vesalainen and 
Kohtamäki, 2015) 
Contracts 
The level of detail and clarity that partners 
have in the formalized, legally-binding 
contracts that govern their relationship 
 
(Handfield and Bechtel, 2002; 
Lusch and Brown, 1996) 
Information 
Sharing 
Partner provides information that informs 
the firm’s business decision-making 
processes, (e.g. price information, 
inventory, forecasts, KPIs, etc.) 
(Chen et al., 2013; Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994; Nyaga et al., 
2010; Prajogo and Olhager, 
2012; Whipple et al., 2010) 
Dedicated 
Resources 
Partner provides relationship-specific 
investments to support the firm; can be 
related to site, physical or human 
resources 
(Handfield and Bechtel, 2002; 
Nyaga et al., 2010; Rinehart et 
al., 2004; Whipple et al., 2010) 
Dependence 
Dependence of one party on the other, 
which causes a power imbalance in the 
relationship, negatively effecting 
organizational behavior. 
(Corsten and Felde, 2005; 
Handfield and Bechtel, 2002) 
Conflicting Views 
Tensions in the relationship caused by 
incongruent economic priorities, goals, 
management styles, philosophies, or 
organizational cultures 
(McKone-Sweet et al., 2005) 
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(Emerson 1962; Morgan and Hunt 1994). The economic perspective considers trust 
as a rational behavior exercised in the right circumstance to maximize utility, such as 
Williamson's (1993) concept of "calculative trust". Early work in game theory also 
probes the role of trust in generating more favorable outcomes: "trust is often 
achieved simply by the continuity of the relation between parties and the recognition 
by each that what he might gain by cheating in a given instance is outweighed by 
the value of the tradition of trust that makes possible a long sequence of future 
agreement." (Schelling 1960, 134–135).  
Rather than provide a comprehensive review of the trust literature, we defer to 
other recent work that synthesizes the inter-organizational trust literature (in 
chronological order):  
 Seppanen, Blomqvist, and Sundqvist (2007) review publications pertaining to 
inter-organizational trust between 1990 and 2003. The review looks at 
multiple aspects of trust research including theoretical lens, 
operationalizations of trust, sub-dimensions, and research methodologies. 
 Whipple, Lynch and Nyaga (2010) summarize the antecedents of successful 
relationships used in over a dozen influential publications in the field. 
 Delbufalo (2012) reviews empirical research about inter-organizational trust, 
published between 1990 and 2010, and presents a systematic literature 
review as well as a meta-analysis of the association of trust with many types 
of outcomes. 
 Whipple, Griffis, and Daughterty (2013) review conceptualizations of inter-
organizational trust in various disciplines and focus on how trust is 
operationalized in the logistics and supply chain literature. They show that 
there have been numerous interpretations of trust and ways to 
operationalization it. 
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 Day, Fawcett, Fawcett and Magnan (2013) amass a list of trust definitions 
taken from some of the key publications on this topic. 
Multiple streams of research have come to show that trust is a necessary 
prerequisite to supply chain integration and successful collaboration efforts. In 
Fawcett et al.’s (2008) study about supply chain collaboration, findings from 51 in-
depth interviews emphasize the importance of trust: "When asked to identify the 
most important prerequisites to alliance success, trust was identified as the single 
most important relationship-building factor." (p. 103). In support of this concept, 
Vanpoucke et al. (2014) build a model of buyer-supplier integration from qualitative 
data and propose that buyer-supplier trust is a critical trigger towards developing 
integration initiatives. 
To the extent that trust induces collaborative relationships between buyers and 
suppliers, literature has established the link between trust and higher performance 
for both parties in a relationship. Several performance dimensions have been 
examined in the context of buyer-supplier trust. Research studies have 
operationalized performance using supply chain operational-level metrics such as on-
time deliveries, reduction in cycle times, and order processing accuracy, among 
other metrics (Handfield and Bechtel 2002; Kalwani and Narayandas 1995; Nyaga, 
Whipple, and Lynch 2010; Whipple, Lynch, and Nyaga 2010). Research has also 
operationalized performance as the satisfaction of the other party with the 
relationship outcomes (Johnston et al. 2004; Nyaga, Whipple, and Lynch 2010).  
H1: Having a higher level of trust in a buyer-supplier relationship is 
positively associated with higher performance for the focal 
organization. 
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Contracts 
Contracts play a role in inter-organizational relationships and are therefore 
factored into many management theories (Dyer and Singh 1998; Gulati 1995; 
Jeffries and Reed 2000). Legally binding agreements between buyers and suppliers 
represent a formalized governance mechanism. In agency theory (Jenson and 
Meckling 1976), different types of contracts can be utilized to mitigate opportunism. 
Depending on the characteristics of the principal-agent relationship and the nature of 
the delegated task, extant research has shown how behavior-based contracts or 
outcome-based contracts mitigate the problem of potential opportunism (Eisenhardt 
1989a; Fayezi, O’Loughlin, and Zutshi 2012). 
Several perspectives have been established regarding the association between 
formalized governance mechanisms (contracts) and relational governance 
mechanisms (trust). The two governance mechanisms have been considered to be 
substitutes by some researchers (Dyer and Singh 1998; Gulati 1995; Uzzi 1997), 
and complementary by others (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). 
For example, Dwyer (1987) argues that trust replaces the need to cover all 
contingencies in contracts while Ring and Van de Ven (1994) call for an ongoing 
balance between informal and formal governance mechanisms. 
Even if formal and informal governance are substitutes, it is clear that they are 
not perfect substitutes. A formalized governance mechanism can never fully manage 
a distrustful relationship (i.e. when the risk of opportunism runs rampant) 
particularly due to the widely accepted assumption of bounded rationality 
(Williamson 1981). On the other hand, even with a high level of trust between a 
buyer and supplier, the relationship is always "conditioned by legal systems" (Ring 
and Van de Ven 1994, 93). 
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The complementary view considers the iterative interactions between buyers and 
suppliers, where trust builds off of the consistent and repeated execution of 
formalized contract agreements. Poppo and Zenger (2002, 712) find evidence of a 
complementary relationship between contracts and trust with the logic that "The 
presence of clearly articulated contractual terms, remedies, and processes of dispute 
resolution as well as relational norms of flexibility, solidarity, bilateralism, and 
continuance may inspire confidence to cooperate in interorganizational exchanges." 
Vanpoucke et al. (2014) develop a model of relational development which proposes 
that trust develops from parties meeting their contractual obligations. Autry and 
Golicic (2010) show how arms-length relationships are initiated with contractual 
agreements and build social capital value over time, leading to a relationship-
performance spiral. Other research also establishes a similar positive feedback loop 
when formal governance gives paves way for relational governance (Ariño and de la 
Torre 1998). Ireland and Webb (2007) propose that contracts buffer economic 
vulnerability and that contractual relationships can generate some trust between 
firms. We subscribe to the perspective that contracts establish the groundwork for 
developing trusting relationships and continue to augment buyer-supplier trust.  
Contracts play a particularly important role in governing healthcare supply 
chains, particularly given the low level of trust and adversarial relationships between 
supply chain partners (L. R. Burns et al. 2009; Dominy and O’Daffer 2011; McKone-
Sweet, Hamilton, and Willis 2005; Schneller and Smeltzer 2006). In healthcare 
supply chains, contracts are an important vehicle for reducing opportunistic behavior 
and uncertainties regarding price changes, stock-outs or disruptions, provision of 
product-related services, and returns of outdated products (Robinson 2015). 
H2: Clearly defined contracts between buyers and suppliers is positively 
associated with trust. 
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Dedicated Resource Investments 
Relationship-specific investments play a large role in a relationship’s longevity 
and success. These idiosyncratic investments enable customized services or 
processes between the supply chain partners, incentivizing parties to maintain the 
relationship and avoid opportunism (Doney and Cannon 1997; Williamson 1981). 
Investing in dedicated resources is a practice that is generally observed to improve 
trust between the buyers and suppliers (Dyer and Singh 1998; Ganesan 1994; 
Nyaga, Whipple, and Lynch 2010; Smith and Barclay 1997). Dedicated resource 
investments can be tangible assets, people, or intangible knowledge (De Vita, 
Tekaya, and Wang 2011; Ganesan 1994). Human-specific resource investments are 
often executed in the form of "guest" or co-located employees, and such 
arrangements benefit both the guest and the host organizations (Dyer 1996b). This 
practice is prevalent in the auto industry, where both supplier and buyer engineers 
participate in the product and process designs of the other party, paving the way for 
a higher level of innovation and co-creation. In fact, the success of Japanese auto-
manufacturers is often attributed to their buyer-supplier human-specific investments 
(Dyer 1996b; Dyer 1996a; Womack, Jones, and Roos 2007).  
In the healthcare industry, dedicated resource investments play an important role 
in the buyer-supplier relationship between, particularly for high-valued medical 
devices and other physician preference items (L. R. Burns et al. 2009). Supplier 
representatives interact intensely with physicians to provide a high level of support 
regarding their products. Supplier sales representative go as far as extending 
technical support during clinical surgery procedures, by assisting the physician with 
the provisioning and calibration of the purchased medical devices. Physical 
resources, such as medical instruments, equipment, and supplier-provided hardware 
and software, are also provided by suppliers (Montgomery and Schneller 2007). This 
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level of support builds a high level of trust between physicians and supplier 
representatives at the individual level, which leads to inter-organizational trust 
(Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998). Even when faced with evidence of product 
equivalency and better prices, physicians frequently continue to recommend buying 
from the entrenched supplier due to these resource investments (L. R. Burns et al. 
2009; Pauly and Burns 2008).  
H3a: Dedicated resource investments by the partner is positively associated 
with the perceived level of trust. 
H3b: Dedicated resource investments by the partner is positively associated 
with the performance of the focal organization. 
Information Sharing 
Information sharing pertains to timely two-way communication of relevant 
information between a buyer and supplier. This includes sharing of price or cost 
information, inventory, supply or demand forecasts, organizational goals, and key 
performance metrics. Information sharing not only supports operational activities 
and decisions, but also brings awareness of product or process innovations available 
through the relationship partner (McEvily and Marcus 2005). Extant literature has 
shown that information sharing is essential to trust building activities (Kwon and Suh 
2005; Anthony S. Roath et al. 2005; Nyaga, Whipple, and Lynch 2010). Chen, 
Preston and Xia (2013) study buyer-supplier relationships in the healthcare context 
and observe that knowledge sharing has a positive impact on hospital-supplier 
integration and supply chain performance. Even though information sharing 
expectations may differ between the buyer and supplier (Whipple, Frankel, and 
Daugherty 2002), evidence suggests that information sharing is perceived to be a 
significant antecedent of trust for both parties (Kwon and Suh 2005; Mohr and 
Spekman 1994; Nyaga, Whipple, and Lynch 2010). 
  42 
H4: Information sharing is positively associated with trust. 
Distrust & Barriers to Trust 
Even with the recent interest in inter-organizational distrust, limited research has 
applied antecedents of distrust (i.e. barriers to trust) in the buyer-supplier 
relationship. Whipple et al. (2010) provide a list of antecedents of successful 
relationships used in recent studies (Table 1, p. 508). From the dozens of constructs 
listed in the table, very few had a clear negative connotation with respect to trust. 
Perhaps the only construct with a clear negative connotation is opportunistic 
behavior (Morgan and Hunt 1994). Other constructs such as conflict, uncertainty and 
dependence have a more ambiguous association with trust and distrust, as their 
effect on trust depends on how they are framed. For example, conflict in some 
studies was framed positively as an opportunity for innovation and joint problem-
solving (e.g. Morgan and Hunt 1994). In other studies, conflict describes situations 
that deteriorate trust (e.g. Kauser and Shaw 2004). The two trust barriers that this 
study examines are dependence and conflicting views. 
Dependence 
Dependence in the trust literature has been framed in multiple ways. One 
conception puts dependence in a positive frame of reference when firms are mutually 
dependent on each other to achieve success (Knemeyer, Corsi, and Murphy 2003). 
This version of the construct, sometimes labeled as interdependence, emphasizes the 
reciprocity and balance in power between the parties (Anthony S. Roath et al. 2005; 
Monczka et al. 1998; e.g., Kauser and Shaw 2004). 
In this research context dependence is framed as a barrier to trust, reflecting a 
power imbalance between the partners, consistent with social exchange theory 
(Emerson 1962). Resource dependence theory looks extensively at the issue of 
dependence in inter-organizational relationships, with one of its axioms being that 
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"patterns of dependence produce inter-organizational as well as intra-organizational 
power, where such power has some effect on organizational behavior" (Hillman, 
Withers, and Collins 2009, 1405). 
The main factors influencing dependence are the importance of the resource to 
the focal firm, the extent of discretion over that product by the resource provider, 
and the prevalence of substitutes in the market (Handfield and Bechtel 2002). With a 
power imbalance, the more powerful partner can abuse his power and behave 
opportunistically. Consistent with Handfield and Bechtel's (2002) model of buyer-
supplier trust, we hypothesize that a greater power imbalance driven by dependence 
reduces the level of trust between the buyer and the supplier. Furthermore, an 
organization that is more dependent on its partner is more willing to compromise in 
order to maintain the relationship (Anderson and Narus 1990). The same dynamic is 
expected to develop whether the supplier or the buyer is in the more powerful 
position (Anderson and Narus 1990). Finally, the power imbalance motivates the 
dependent partner in the relationship to enter into stronger contracts, to provide 
safeguards against opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1981). 
H5a: Dependence is negatively associated with trust. 
H5b: Dependence is negatively associated with performance. 
H5c: Dependence is positively associated with the contracts. 
Conflicting Views 
Conflicts inevitably arise in inter-organizational relationships, whether at the level 
of interacting individuals or at the organizational level. Some conflicts, labeled as 
functional conflicts, arise from business-as-usual circumstances and are perceived as 
beneficial for a healthy relationship (Anderson and Narus 1990; Morgan and Hunt 
1994). In fact, the absence or avoidance of functional conflicts may indicate 
complacency and excessive trust, which is counterproductive (Day et al. 2013; 
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Villena, Revilla, and Choi 2011). This also occurs at the interpersonal level where 
individuals representing opposing sides in the buyer-supplier relationship avoid 
conflict to preserve their personal friendship (Jeffries and Reed 2000).  
More serious conflicts, on the other hand, can have detrimental effects on trust. 
Such conflicts involve issues of divergent management styles, philosophies, or 
organizational cultures, and are much harder to resolve (Kauser and Shaw 2004). 
Discordant economic priorities or incongruent goals between organizations can lead 
to procedural tensions and a higher risk of opportunistic behavior (Cuevas, Julkunen, 
and Gabrielsson 2015). Lack of transparency about operating metrics pertaining to 
the relationship can signal ulterior motives and hinder trust. Such misunderstanding 
and conflicting views can impede trust to the point of relationship dissolution (Park 
and Ungson 1997). 
H6: Conflicting views are negatively associated with the perceived level of 
trust 
The full conceptual model based on the hypotheses is presented in Figure 4.  
The Perspectives of Buyers and Suppliers 
There have been studies that consider the similarities and differences between 
buyer and supplier perceptions of the relationships (Anderson and Narus 1990; 
Nyaga, Whipple, and Lynch 2010; Whipple, Frankel, and Daugherty 2002). Some 
studies have used dyadic pairs of buyers and suppliers to address research questions 
(e.g. Carter 2000; Whipple, Frankel, and Daugherty 2002). In this study, we 
separately analyzed the two samples in order to examine the differences in general 
perceptions between the buyers and suppliers, and not necessarily how specific pairs 
of buyers and suppliers differ in perceptions. 
Buyers and suppliers may experience different degrees of success and 
satisfaction coming from the relationship (e.g., Benton and Maloni 2005). This is 
  45 
natural due to factors discussed earlier, such as dependence, and their level of 
investment in that relationship. Each party may prioritize different factors, and find 
some factors more relevant to trust. For example, Whipple et al. (2002) examine a 
dyadic sample and observe that information sharing priorities differed between 
buyers and suppliers, where buyers valued accuracy of information while suppliers 
valued timeliness of information. 
More recently, Nyaga et al. (2010) examine a trust model on the independent 
buyer and supplier samples and find some differences in the general perceptions of 
trust between the two. One difference was that buyers placed more emphasis on 
trust’s impact on performance outcomes while suppliers placed more emphasis on 
the inputs towards trust, such as information sharing. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
A survey instrument was designed to measure healthcare buyer and supplier 
perceptions of trust, antecedents, and performance regarding their most important 
supply chain partner. The constructs applied in this study were measured using 
scales from literature where available. Table 4 provides a list of the constructs used 
along with the sources we referred to obtain measurement scales. We did not find 
 
 
Figure 4. Conceptual Model 
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specific scales for the conflicting views construct and, therefore, developed a new 
scale based on the literature. All measurement items utilized a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". In some cases, the items were 
modified from the original scale to be more relevant to the healthcare context, and 
as an outcome of the pre-test. For example, the items measuring dedicated 
investments were taken from Nyaga et al. (2010) but were modified to address 
clinical support and technology. Appendix B presents all the measurement items, 
with their factor loadings for both the buyer and supplier samples.  
To validate our survey instrument and assess the reliability of our measures, a 
pilot survey was distributed to healthcare providers (i.e. the “buyers”), and 93 
complete responses were obtained. The results of the pre-test showed high reliability 
of the instrument, and therefore only minor changes were applied before the main 
survey was rolled out. This step was particularly important for validating the scales 
for the barriers to trust since we found less guidance from the literature regarding 
constructing these scales, particularly for conflicting views. The main survey 
consisted of Likert scale items to measure the seven constructs relevant for this 
study, as well as a host of demographic questions. Two versions of the survey were 
distributed, measuring the same constructs but with minor changes in wording based 
on whether the respondent was a buyer or supplier (ex. “supplier keeps 
commitments” versus “customer keeps commitments”). The surveys were distributed 
to buyers and suppliers via email, with a cover letter that explained the purpose of 
the project. The mailing list was provided by the Association for Healthcare Resource 
and Materials Management (AHRMM) and the Association of National Account 
Executives (ANAE). We anticipated the survey to take between 15 to 20 minutes to 
complete. 
Buyer Sample 
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The buyer survey was distributed to 9,411 potential respondents (i.e. healthcare 
systems and hospitals). We received 695 responses (7.4% response rate) in total. 
After removing responses that failed the screening criteria ("Are you in a role in 
which you interact with Supplier Organizations?") and removing responses with 
missing data, the usable sample was reduced to 458 responses. Table 5 presents 
summary statistics regarding the characteristics of the respondents, the 
organizations they represented, and information about their most important supplier. 
Compared to the population of hospitals in the United States, the collected sample is 
biased towards larger hospitals (in terms of bed size)2. 
                                           
2 In our sample, 27% of hospitals had more than 400 beds, while 25% had less than 99 beds. Data on 5,686 
registered hospitals in the United States, collected in 2012 showed that 8% of hospitals had over 400 beds 
and 53% had less than 99 beds (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2012). 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics about the buyer and supplier data samples 
 Buyers Sample (N= 458) Suppliers Sample (N=460) 
Organization 
Size 
25.0% - under 100 beds, 
27.2% - over 400 beds. 
28.0% - revenue under $50 million, 
34.5% - revenue over $1 billion. 
Organization 
type 
68.3% of hospitals represented 
were not-for-profit. 
35% of hospitals are part of a 
Health System / IDN. 
54% of suppliers offered two or more 
product categories. 
65.1% of respondents identified their 
main product category to be PPI, 
Medical/Surgical devices, or Capital 
Equipment. 
Respondent's 
Industry 
Experience 
86.8% have at least 10 years 
of experience in healthcare 
36.8% have at least 10 years of 
experience in healthcare 
Respondent's 
Current Position 
48% of respondents have had 
their current role for at least 
10 years. 
53% of respondents are at the 
Vice President or Director level. 
38.4% of respondents have had their 
current role for at least 10 years. 
63% of respondents are at the CEO, 
Vice President or Director level. 
Respondent's 
Work 
Background 
31% have a clinical 
background. 
15% previously worked for a 
supplier. 
20.3% have a clinical background. 
19.2% previously worked for a 
hospital / IDN. 
Most important 
relationship 
62.5% indicated that their 
most important relationship is 
with distributers, 33% with 
manufacturers. 
46% indicated that their most 
important relationship is with 
hospitals/health systems, 
29.5% with National Group Purchasing 
Organizations. 
Length of 
Relationship 
67% of responses have had a 
relationship with their best 
su plier for over 5 years. 
86% of respondents have had a 
relationship with their best customer 
for over 10 years.
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Supplier Sample 
The supplier survey was distributed to 5,220 potential respondents (i.e. medical 
device manufacturers and distributors), and 612 responses were received in total 
(11.7% response rate). After filtering out missing responses and unqualified 
respondents (i.e. those who answered no to "Are you in a role in which you interact 
with Healthcare Provider Organizations?") the usable sample was reduced to 460 
responses. Over 60% of the respondents represented suppliers who focused on 
physician preference items, medical/surgical devices or capital equipment. These 
items generally make up the majority of supply spend for hospitals (Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007). A majority of the respondents were at a director level or higher.  
 
ANALYSIS 
Measurement Model 
A confirmatory factor analysis was used to analyze the twenty-three survey items 
used to measure the seven constructs of interest, using MPlus version 7.2. The 
measurement models for the two samples displayed good fit statistics, based on 
generally accepted fit statistic standards (Kline 2010). The measurement model fit 
statistics for the buyer sample was: CFI = 0.961, NNFI of 0.953, RMSEA = 0.057 and 
SRMR = 0.039. The measurement model fit statistics for the supplier sample was: 
CFI = 0.950, NNFI of 0.940, RMSEA = 0.048 and SRMR = 0.043. 
 
 
Reliability and Validity 
To assess reliability of the measurement scales, Cronbach's alpha and the 
composite reliability were calculated for each construct. All constructs displayed a 
Cronbach's alpha above 0.70, indicating good reliability (Nunnally and Bernstein 
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1994). Recent research in the methodological literature has questioned the 
usefulness of Cronbach's alpha as a measure of internal consistency (Bentler 2008; 
Sijtsma 2009), and, therefore, the composite reliability, which is another measure of 
internal consistency, is also measured. The composite reliability for all constructs in 
both samples, as listed in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, was observed to be above the general 
guidelines of above 0.70 (Hair et al. 2010). 
Two types of construct validity are commonly examined in studies of this type. 
First, convergent validity establishes that the items that should be related to each 
construct are, in fact, related to each other and measure the same construct. The 
constructs in this study showed convergent validity with all factor loadings being 
significant at p < 0.001. The average variance extracted (AVE), was generally above 
the commonly applied threshold of 0.50 (O’Leary-Kelly and J. Vokurka 1998), except 
for two constructs in the supplier sample (dependence and conflicting views), but 
nonetheless, their AVE was very close to the suggested threshold. 
Discriminant validity examines whether different constructs, which are expected 
to measure distinct concepts, are unrelated. To confirm discriminant validity at the 
item level, we observe that all items have a higher loading on the intended construct 
than any other construct. To confirm discriminant validity at the construct level (i.e. 
verifying that each construct is unique), we check that the AVE values are greater 
than the average shared variance (ASV) across all constructs, which is confirmed by 
the analysis. Finally, the square root of the AVE for each construct should be greater 
than inter-construct correlations related to that construct (Hair et al. 2010). One 
exception to this test of discriminant validity in our sample is with the dedicated 
resources construct, whose square root AVE was lower than its correlation with 
information sharing. This is not very surprising, considering that dedicated resources 
(whether human resources or IT resources) represent an important medium for 
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information sharing. We performed a secondary validation, where we tested a model 
which set as a constraint the correlation between Dedicated Resources and 
Information Sharing. The difference in the chi-square statistics of the constrained 
model and the unconstrained model was significantly worse (buyer model: Δχ2 = 
238.7, df= 1, p-value <0.001; supplier model: Δχ2 = 212.5, df=1, p-value <0.01), 
indicating that our theorized factor model provided a better fit for the data.  
Keeping in mind that the generally accepted followed guidelines do not 
necessarily imply hard cutoffs, we opt to use our a priori theoretical framework and 
Table 6.1. Reliability and inter-construct correlations for the buyer sample 
Buyer Sample CR AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Trust 0.924 0.803 0.896             
2. Performance 0.923 0.749 0.806 0.866           
3. Contracts 0.923 0.800 0.790 0.759 0.895         
4. Info Sharing 0.837 0.633 0.461 0.492 0.433 0.796       
5. Ded. Resources 0.819 0.603 0.362 0.455 0.384 0.790 0.776     
6. Dependence 0.864 0.681 0.228 0.262 0.257 0.071 0.176 0.825   
7. Conflicting Views 0.945 0.812 0.268 0.265 0.222 0.040 0.089 0.747 0.901 
 
Table 6.2. Reliability and inter-construct correlations for the supplier sample. 
Supplier Sample CR AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Trust 0.894 0.739 0.860       
2. Performance 0.871 0.631 0.584 0.794      
3. Contracts 0.849 0.656 0.734 0.520 0.810     
4. Info Sharing 0.845 0.645 0.486 0.415 0.446 0.803    
5. Ded. Resources 0.754 0.507 0.353 0.401 0.351 0.786 0.712   
6. Dependence 0.724 0.470 0.150 0.215 0.122 0.087 0.109 0.686  
7. Conflicting Views 0.774 0.463 0.228 0.232 0.314 0.175 0.245 0.388 0.681 
CR = Composite reliability, AVE = Average Variance Extracted, matrix's diagonal is the square root 
of the AVE. 
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move forward with our factor structure, (Fawcett et al. 2014). Tables 6.1 and 6.2 
summarize the reliability and validity measures for the buyer and supplier samples, 
respectively. 
Common Method and Non-Response Bias 
Because all measurements within each observation were taken from a single 
respondent, our data becomes exposed to the risk of common method bias. One 
qualitative approach to gauge the risk of common method bias is to examine the 
correlation matrix between the latent variables (Craighead et al. 2011). Insignificant 
correlations in the results provide some indication of the low risk of common method 
bias. A statistical approach used to check for common method bias is the Harman 
Single Factor Test (Podsakoff et al. 2003). This test loads all measurement items 
onto a single latent construct to see if either a single-factor model adequately fits the 
data or if one factor accounts for the majority of covariance in the measures. For 
both the buyer and supplier samples, several factors were identified and the first 
factor did not account for the majority of the variance (the first factor accounted for 
35% and 24% of the variance in the provider and supplier samples, respectively). 
This suggests that common method bias is not a major threat in the collected data. 
 
Note: *p-value < 0.01; **p-value < 0.001 
Figure 5. Buyer (healthcare providers) model results 
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Although the threat of common method bias can never be resolved unless there are 
multiple respondents per observation, the qualitative and statistical checks 
performed provide some assurance that the risk of common method bias is not high 
in this study. 
Non-response bias was also assessed by comparing the responses from the first 
and last wave of respondents, which were four weeks apart. We compared responses 
across all twenty-three survey items and found no significant differences between 
responses of the first wave and the last wave, based on a two-tailed T-Test (p-values 
for all the tests were greater than 0.01). Furthermore, we compared demographic 
variables (size of the organization, and the number of years the respondent has 
worked for the organization) and found no significant differences between the early 
and late respondents. 
Structural Equation Model 
A structural equation model was estimated using MPlus software (Version 7.2). 
We tested our theoretical model on our two samples. Based on the global fit indices, 
both models demonstrated a good fit given the observed data, exceeding 
recommended thresholds (Kline 2010). The results of the two models are provided in 
 
Note: *p-value < 0.01 **p-value < 0.001  
Figure 6. Supplier (distributors, medical device manufacturers) model results 
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Figure 5 and Figure 6, showing the global fit statistics, the path coefficients and their 
respective standard errors (in parentheses). 
Hypotheses Support 
Not all of the hypotheses that were proposed were supported, but even the lack 
of support provide interesting insights. First, trust was shown to have a positive and 
significant impact on Performance (H1). Contracts, Dedicated Resources, and 
Information Sharing were all hypothesized to positively impact trust. These 
hypotheses were supported for Contracts (H2) and Information Sharing (H4), but not 
Dedicated Resources (H3a). Dedicated Resources was shown to have a positive and 
significant impact on Performance as hypothesized (H3b). Results also indicated that 
Dependence has a significant positive impact on Contracts (H5c), but no direct 
impact on Trust (H5a) nor Performance (H5b). Conflicting Views shows a positive 
and significant impact on trust in the buyer sample (H6) which is opposite of what 
was hypothesized, but no significant relationship in the supplier sample. Finally, the 
combination of supported hypotheses (H1, H2, and H5c) and unsupported 
hypotheses (H5a and H5b) suggests that the association between dependence and 
performance is fully mediated by contracts and trust. This mediation is statistically 
validated in a later subsection based on accepted methodological guidelines (e.g. 
McKinnon 2008; Rungtusanatham, Miller, and Boyer 2014). 
Overall, the samples of buyers and suppliers were highly consistent, except for 
the hypothesis that tested the relationship between Conflicting Views and Trust (H6). 
Additionally, the associated between Trust and Performance showed the same effect 
in both samples but differed in magnitude. Buyers perceived that Trust had a greater 
impact on Performance compared to the perception of suppliers. Observations of the 
differences between the samples are statistically validated through the invariance 
analysis discussed below and summarized in Table 8. 
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Mediation Analysis 
A mediation analysis was conducted to examine the mediating relationship 
between Dependence, Contracts, Trust, and Performance. First, we verify the role of 
Contracts as a mediator between Dependence and Trust, following recommendations 
by Rungtusanatham, Miller, and Boyer (2014) for testing mediation. We conducted a 
Sobel Test (McKinnon 2008; Sobel 1982), which is a commonly used method to test 
for a mediation effect, and find that the indirect effect of Dependence on Trust (via 
Contracts) is significantly different than zero (Sobel test= 5.9, s.e. = 0.028, p < 
0.001). Furthermore, the direct path from Dependence to Trust is not significant, 
suggesting full mediation. Second, all the direct and indirect paths between 
Dependence and Performance are examined and evidence suggests that the effect of 
Dependence on Performance is fully mediated by Contracts and Trust. Table 7 
presents the direct and indirect paths between Dependence and Performance, 
showing that the path with the highest magnitude is the one that passes through 
both Contracts and Trust. 
Measurement and Structural Invariance  
Our survey structure enables us to examine the congruency between buyer and 
supplier perceptions since we use the same survey items and factor structures across 
the two groups and have similar sample sizes. Measurement invariance 
quantitatively examines whether structures of latent constructs are consistent under 
Table 7. Mediation analysis 
Structural Path  Buyer    Supplier  
 
Coeff. S.E. p-value  Coeff. S.E. 
p-
value 
Dependence → Performance 0.067 0.037 0.073  0.114 0.053 0.031 
Dependence → Trust → Performance -0.044 0.055 0.422  0.037 0.031 0.237 
Dep. → Contract → Trust → Perf. 0.155 0.031 < 0.01  0.054 0.021 < 0.01 
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different conditions or sub-samples in multiple steps: configural invariance, metric 
invariance and scalar invariance (Meade and Lautenschlager 2004). Configural 
invariance is considered to be the first and most basic form of measurement 
invariance, which indicates whether the number of factors and item loading structure 
is consistent across two groups (Kline 2010). To test this, the measurement model is 
simultaneously fitted to the two independent samples, and the goodness-of-fit 
statistics are observed. In our sample, the configural invariance model fit the data 
well (Table 8), thus the constructs and loading structure are consistent across 
groups.  
The second form of invariance, metric invariance, assesses whether the factor 
loadings themselves are equivalent across the groups. To test this, we constrain the 
factor loadings to be equal across the two groups, and assess the difference in chi-
square (Δχ2) compared to the configural invariance model. However, since Δχ2 is 
sensitive to sample size, it has become questionable whether this measure is useful 
in studies of large sample sizes (Cheung and Rensvold 2002; Kline 2010). As an 
alternative, researchers have suggested comparing fit indices, particularly the CFI 
(Cheung and Rensvold 2002; Meade, Johnson, and Braddy 2008). Chueng and 
Rensvold (2002) suggest that a change in CFI less than 0.01 indicates that the null 
Table 8. Invariance models fit statistics 
Model χ2 d.f. CFI NNFI RMSEA Δχ2 
Measurement Invariance       
Configural Invariance (baseline) 1250.88 592 0.953 0.994 0.049 - 
Metric Invariance 1308.59 611 0.950 0.943 0.050 57.71 
Scalar Invariance 1610.72 630 0.930 0.922 0.058 302.1 
Structural Invariance       
Baseline Model 1796.42 646 0.918 0.911 0.062 - 
Full Structural Invariance 1832.91 656 0.916 0.0910 0.063 36.49 
Partial Structural Invariance* 1802.358 654 0.918 0.912 0.062 5.94 
*This model relaxes the invariance constraints on two paths: Conflicting Views → Trust, and 
Trust → Performance. 
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hypothesis of the invariance model should not be rejected. In our sample, the CFI of 
the metric invariance model is reduced by 0.003 relative to the configural model, 
indicating that the factor loadings are invariant across the buyer and supplier 
samples. A more restrictive form of invariance, scalar invariance, poses constraints 
on the intercepts. Imposing constraints on the intercepts results in fit statistics that 
are substantially lower than the metric invariance model (Table 8) and, therefore, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the buyer and supplier samples demonstrate scalar 
invariance. 
Structural invariance compares the consistency of the structural path model 
between the two groups (buyers and suppliers). The chi-squared of the full structural 
invariance model (where path coefficients are constrained to be equal across the two 
groups) is compared against a baseline model, where all path coefficients are allowed 
to differ between groups. The results (in Table 8) show that differences exist 
between the two models (Δχ2 = 36.49, df = 10, p < 0.001). We identified the 
constrained paths that cause the greatest amount of misfit by examining the 
modification indices, and relaxed the constraints on these paths, arriving at a partial 
structural invariance model. This model allows the path between conflicting views 
and trust, as well as trust and performance to vary across groups. Comparing this 
model with the baseline, we find no significant differences (Δχ2 = 5.94, df = 8, p = 
0.654), implying that all other paths are consistent across the two groups. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the theoretical and managerial implications related to the 
main findings of this study. First, the general comparison and points of deviation 
between the buyer and supplier perceptions will be discussed. Second, we highlight 
the implications of the mediated relationship between dependence and trust, and 
  57 
relate it to very recent work in power and dependence between buyers and suppliers 
(Hingley, Angell, and Campelo 2015). Finally, limitations and future research 
opportunities that come out of this work are discussed. 
Comparing Buyer and Supplier Perceptions 
There is a high level of congruence between the perceptions of buyers and 
suppliers regarding the barriers and enablers of trust based on this study, with two 
notable differences. A notable point of divergence between the buyer and the 
suppliers is the perceived impact of relationship trust and the performance that 
comes as an outcome of the relationship. Based on the invariance analysis, buyers 
perceived a significantly higher association between trust and performance, 
compared to suppliers. Suppliers may perceive themselves in a dominant position in 
this industry, where relationships are very "sticky" and driven largely by physicians 
rather than materials managers (L. R. Burns et al. 2009; Lerner et al. 2008). As a 
consequence, suppliers may find lesser value from the partnerships with the buyers 
since they already gain much of the value through their position of power. On the 
other hand, a relatively underpowered buyer gains a bigger performance advantage 
from a trusting relationship. This is consistent with recent literature regarding the 
effect of power on trust and performance (Chicksand 2015; Cuevas, Julkunen, and 
Gabrielsson 2015), making it likely that relative power between buyer and supplier 
moderates the relationship between trust and performance. This finding is also 
similar to Nyaga et al.’s (2010) finding that commitment and trust reflect on 
performance more strongly with the buyers than with the suppliers. 
The other point of divergence between the buyer and supplier models is how 
Conflict was perceived. The supplier model revealed no significant association 
between conflict and trust while the buyer model revealed a positive and significant 
association with trust. The latter finding contradicts what we hypothesized, which 
  58 
was that Conflict is negatively associated with Trust. We measured Conflict as the 
perceived incongruence in economic priorities and sales/marketing strategies 
between the parties and the lack of full transparency, all of which may sow the seeds 
of opportunistic behavior (Kang and Jindal 2015; Lamming et al. 2001). However, 
Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) seminal work on buyer-supplier trust shows that conflicts 
can positively influence trust. In their model, they find that conflict is positively 
associated with trust and is not significantly associated with opportunism. Some level 
of conflict and tension is inevitable between two parties in an exchange relationship, 
and parties accept the fact that there will be incongruent economic incentives driving 
each party. A healthy level of tension may even be necessary to encourage ongoing 
communication, which fosters long-term trust (Anderson and Narus 1990; Dwyer, 
Schurr, and Oh 1987).  The divergence of perceptions in our analysis regarding 
conflict and trust certainly raises more questions about what a “healthy” level of 
functional conflict should look like and whether there are other variables that 
mediate this association, such as contracts or communication. Finally, it is important 
to keep in mind that the survey had asked respondents to provide information about 
their most important buyer/supplier. Thus, the importance of this buyer/supplier may 
overshadow any negative perceptions of trust from functional conflicts. 
Dependence-Contracts-Trust Mediation 
An interesting finding that comes from this study is the mediation between 
dependence, contracts, and trust. This causal chain from dependence to contracting 
to trust and, finally, to performance was originally hypothesized by Handfield and 
Bechtel (2002) based on previous research arguing that contracts establish voluntary 
restraints on the use of power (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990). However, 
Handfield and Bechtel do not find the evidence to support their causal chain.  Several 
reasons may help explain how this study is able to support this mediation 
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hypothesis. First, this study had higher statistical power due to a much larger sample 
size of over 450 observations for each of the buyer and supplier samples, compared 
to Handfield and Bechtel’s sample of 97 usable responses. Second, the sample in this 
study is focused on a single industry, which has been traditionally known to have 
adversarial relationships between the hospital buyers and medical device suppliers 
(L. R. Burns et al. 2009; McKone-Sweet, Hamilton, and Willis 2005). As a 
consequence, the true effect size may be greater in this context, making it easier to 
detect. 
This dynamic between dependence and performance is a fully-mediated 
relationship since dependence does not directly influence trust nor performance in 
the presence of the path through contracts. Multiple tests for mediation were 
conducted (as presented in the results section) to validate this observation. This 
finding carries significant implication to the healthcare industry and relationship 
management in general, by presenting contracting as an effective mechanism to 
address concerns of dependence on the other party, and making it viable for 
organizations to develop trusting relationship regardless of their divergence in size or 
industry clout. This idea is supported by recent work revealing that buyer-supplier 
trust can develop despite a high level of dependence and power asymmetry, when 
other mechanisms mediate the dependence-trust relationship (Cuevas, Julkunen, 
and Gabrielsson 2015). Cuevas et al. (2015) propose that goal congruence can be 
this mediator, and our contribution shows that contracting can be another such 
mediator. 
Information Sharing and Dedicated Resources  
Information sharing was positively associated with trust for both the buyer and 
supplier samples, consistent with our hypotheses. Information sharing is a core 
ingredient for trust and this is no different in our study. The more pressing issue 
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regarding information sharing, especially in the health sector, is not whether an 
organization should share information with its trading partner, but rather whether 
the organization has the capability and infrastructure to collect and share information 
that is adequate, timely, and accurate. Hospitals and suppliers need to jointly 
consider the gains from information sharing in order to resolve the gap in 
information sharing. New “unique device identification” (UDI) standards for product 
barcoding and registering, as mandated by the Food and Drug Administration, may 
provide some justification for both hospitals and suppliers to invest in the adequate 
information capturing and sharing infrastructure (The Brookings Institute 2015; 
Wilson 2012). Providers can benefit from the information provided by suppliers about 
product usage, availability, price transparency, and alternatives. Suppliers value 
information from health providers relating to product performance, demand 
forecasting, and utilization. 
Dedicated resource investments did not significantly impact trust, but positively 
impacted performance for both buyers and suppliers. While our hypothesis about 
dedicated resources having a positive impact on trust was not supported, the 
findings are consistent with other work (Handfield and Bechtel 2002; Nyaga, 
Whipple, and Lynch 2010; Whipple, Lynch, and Nyaga 2010). It appears that 
respondents acknowledge the value of the resources provided by the other party, in 
terms of improving the performance that results from the relationship, but it does 
not improve trust. It is likely that dedicated resources are a required component of 
the relationship, and are therefore factored into the cost of the transaction rather 
than considered as goodwill. Dedicated resources provide interesting implications to 
the dark-side of buyer-supplier relationships (Day et al. 2013). In fact, recent 
discussions in the medical device industry have been about replacing supplier 
embedded human resources (sales representatives) with newly trained hospital 
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employees that substitute for the supplier sales representatives (J. Lee 2014). 
However, removing supplier dedicated resources does not negate the need for the 
hospital to gain knowledge about new products and their application; information 
that only the supplier may possess.   
Post-Hoc Analysis 
Our non-findings with regards to the association between dedicated resource 
investments and trust motivated a posthoc analysis. As mentioned earlier, supply 
managers in the health sector often associate supplier resources (particularly human 
resources) with opportunism, upselling, and winning the physician’s favor, at the 
expense of the hospital (L. R. Burns et al. 2009; Robinson 2015). This view of 
dedicated resources runs contrary to the “mainstream” views in other industries that 
consider dedicated investments as enablers or trust (Dyer and Singh 1998; Nyaga, 
Whipple, and Lynch 2010; Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003). We opted to further 
explore the impact of dedicated resources on trust, given the increased attention to 
the potentially hazardous effects of supplier dedicated resources in hospitals (Kracov 
et al. 2013; J. Lee 2014). With the idea that complex surgical supplies better justify 
the need for dedicated resources relative to other product categories, we separated 
the buyer sample into two categories: a category whose most important supplier 
provided complex surgical supplies (general surgery, cardiology, orthopedics, spine, 
or other surgical specialty; N=213) and the rest of the buyers who reported about 
suppliers that provided non-surgical supplies (N=244).  
We retested the same model focusing on how the perceptions between dedicated 
resources differed between the two groups of buyers. The results showed that buyers 
of non-surgical supplies perceived dedicated resources to be negatively associated to 
trust (coefficient=-0.219, s.e.=0.109, p=0.044). Buyers of surgical supplies showed 
perceptions consistent with the aggregate buyer sample, in that dedicated resources 
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did not significantly impact trust (coefficient=-0.028, s.e.=0.068, p=0.680). All other 
relationships in the model were consistent with our aggregate model. This finding 
reflects the concerns in healthcare about supplier opportunism when it comes to 
bundling services with products, particularly with products that do not hold the 
complexity that necessitates dedicated resources (Robinson 2015; M. Thill 2015). 
Limitations and Future Research 
A promising area of future research pointed to by our findings is to further 
investigate the role of dedicated resources (or asset-specific investment) on buyer-
supplier trust and performance. Several previous studies that have attempted to 
study this concept (e.g., Handfield and Bechtel 2002; Nyaga, Whipple, and Lynch 
2010) have hypothesized a positive relationship between dedicated resource 
investments and trust but find no support for this hypothesis based on their sample 
(e.g., Handfield and Bechtel 2002). It is certainly interesting to parse the types of 
dedicated resource investments into human resources and physical or informational 
resources. Furthermore, identifying whether such resources are directly or indirectly 
accounted for in pricing may also clarify these concepts. At least in our study, there 
is acknowledgement that supplier representatives are necessary to provide value for 
the buyers (since dedicated resources were positively associated with performance), 
but much skepticism remains regarding the true motives and potential hidden 
agenda of these suppliers, to the point that some healthcare systems have started 
outsourcing or disintermediating the role of the supplier representative (J. Lee 2014; 
Pauly and Burns 2008). A fruitful research direction that can push the boundaries of 
our knowledge about the dark-side of buyer-supplier trust can examine the 
conditions where dedicated resources are perceived to be beneficial to trust (Dyer 
and Singh 1998), trust-neutral, or detrimental to trust (Day et al. 2013). 
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Finally, the role of the physician in the buyer-supplier relationship as a “surrogate 
buyer” draws significant implications that may not be well captured in our dyadic 
trust model (Bhakoo, Prakash Singh, and Amrik Sohal 2012). Courtship efforts by 
both hospital purchasing managers and supplier representatives make a case for 
conceptualizing buyer-supplier relationships in the triadic context (L. R. Burns et al. 
2009). This context can certainly benefit from--and be of benefit to--recent 
developments in service triads research (e.g., Wynstra, Spring, and Schoenherr 
2015). 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The large accumulation of research about inter-organizational trust and continued 
interest in the topic underscores the importance of this research area (Delbufalo 
2012). There is little debate left that trust provides mutual gain for supply chain 
partners. However, more research is needed to examine the progression and 
attainment of trust, which recent research has begun to explore (Vanpoucke, 
Vereecke, and Boyer 2014). Furthermore, an excess of any trust enabler, such as 
dedicated resource investments or long contracts, may tip the balance towards 
entrenchment and "sticky" relationships, causing complacency and relationship 
stagnation (Day et al. 2013). Findings in this study begin to consider such 
implications, particularly with the frequent negative portrayal of dedicated human 
resources in healthcare. There is an acknowledgment that there is value in the 
services that supplier representatives offer, but also a high-level suspicion around 
supplier representatives, at least as perceived by hospital purchasing managers and 
executives (J. Lee 2014; Robinson 2015). Perhaps a mix of multiple trust enablers 
(contracts, information transparency, and dedicated resource investments) is what is 
required to create a balanced trusting relationship. 
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Healthcare supply chains demonstrate a considerable lack of trust among trading 
partners (Dominy and O’Daffer 2011), providing a fitting context to study some of 
the trust barriers as well as how commonly recognized enablers are perceived in this 
adversarial environment. We examined both buyer (i.e. the hospitals) and supplier 
(manufacturers or distributors) perspectives, finding that they are highly congruent. 
Furthermore, perceptions of trust and its antecedents also generally agreed with 
findings in multi-industry samples of buyers and suppliers  (Handfield and Bechtel 
2002; Nyaga, Whipple, and Lynch 2010), with a few notable differences. In this 
environment, characterized by a high level of distrust, contracting appears to be an 
effective mechanism to hedge the risk of opportunism, clearing a way for 
collaborative relationships. Formalized contracts in the healthcare sector play a 
pivotal role in defining the buyer-supplier relationship, especially when this 
relationship is tempered by others forces such as intermediation (distributors, GPOs, 
consolidated service centers etc.) and government regulations. As healthcare 
systems engage in contracting in an environment characterized by global sourcing, 
pressures towards reducing supplier-base and customized demand, the contracting 
language must be diligent in its ability to reduce dependency and sustain successful 
relationships. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL BUYERS IN A SUPPLY CHAIN TRIAD 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines how alignment between players of an agency triad in a 
supply management context influences decisions and performance. We apply the 
literature on professionalism and supply chain triads to the health sector to better 
understand the procurement process, which involves the physician, hospital, and 
medical device manufacturer. Based on a cross-sectional sample of hospital data, we 
estimate random effects models to investigate the association between physician-
hospital integration arrangements and hospital supply performance. Our results 
provide empirical evidence that physician-hospital alignment is associated with lower 
hospital supply expenses, supporting theoretical propositions about agency triads. 
The findings contribute to research surrounding supply chain triads, the role of 
professionals in health care procurement and has implications for healthcare 
management research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research on supply chain triads has increased significantly in the past decade. 
Some researchers have proposed that the triad is the smallest unit of analysis to 
consider when studying supply networks (Choi and Wu 2009). In a recent special 
issue by the Journal of Operations Management, Wynstra, Spring, and Schoenherr 
(2015) map out the theoretical progression and proliferation of triads in the supply 
chain literature. Of particular interest to this research is the branch of supply chain 
triads that considers two internal actors--usually the purchasing department and a 
professional—and a supplier as an external actor. The involvement of professionals 
as “surrogate buyers” (Solomon 1986) in the procurement process introduces 
significant complications to the buyer-supplier dyad, effectively transposing it into an 
agency triad (Tate et al. 2010). 
 Professionalization has become prevalent in society, with the global trend 
towards knowledge-based economies. Sociologists have long studied how professions 
represent a departure from other occupations with their high level of power, 
autonomy, knowledge monopolization, and exclusionary jurisdictions (Abbott 1988; 
Freidson 1983; Larson 1979). Even when employed within bureaucratic 
organizations, professionals such as lawyers, accountants, physicians, or engineers 
have a strong influence in the decision-making and value creation processes. In 
supply chain management, this translates to conflicts between supply managers and 
the professional users. Supply managers often find themselves at odds with the 
professionals, particularly in matters of supply selection (Lewis 2012; Tate et al. 
2010; Wind and Robertson 1982). In such a context, professionals assume the role 
of surrogate buyers who make decisions based on their expertise, on behalf of the 
buyer or consumer (i.e. the organization). Therefore, in purchasing matters with 
surrogate buyer involvement, two principals –the professional and the supply 
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manager—interface with the agent supplier. Divergent incentives (or simply a lack of 
communication) between the two principals can lead to sourcing issues and exposes 
the principals to opportunism by the agent (Tate et al. 2010). Thus, alignment 
between the supply manager and the professional is essential in navigating supply 
chain agency triads. 
Our research question asks how two different types of alignment between the 
two principals of the agency triad impacts procurement performance. We build upon 
the work of Tate et al. (2010) by empirically validating some of their theoretical 
propositions, and applying the theory to other professional services outside 
marketing. Our work also answers the call for future research in a recent study by 
Nyaga et al. (2015), which begins to examine impacts of physician-hospital 
alignment on hospital supply chain performance. We address several limitations in 
that study and further develop their theoretical basis. The physician-hospital-supplier 
triad has long been a topic of discussion in the healthcare management literature 
(Burns et al. 2009; Lerner et al. 2008; Montgomery and Schneller 2007; Pauly and 
Burns 2008), and we believe it is important that the supply chain literature 
participates in this discussion, both to inform healthcare practice and to expand upon 
supply chain theory (Abdulsalam et al., 2015).  
Drawing from sociology and management theory on professionalism in 
bureaucratic contexts (Freidson 1983; A. Sharma 1997), we examine two 
mechanisms that push physicians towards aligning with the bureaucratic organization 
they reside in bureaucratic pressures and professional hierarchy pressures. Using a 
random effects regression model, we operationalize our hypotheses in the healthcare 
context. The analysis is based on a U.S. sample of hospitals and considers 
bureaucratic pressures in the form of physician employment; and professional 
hierarchy pressures as physician affiliations with various forms of physician-hospital 
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arrangements. Our analysis indicates that both physician employment and physician 
affiliations with tightly-integrated physician-hospital arrangements lead to a 
reduction in supply expenses. The results demonstrate that these two alignment 
mechanisms, which have very different implications and structures for both the 
professionals and the organization (i.e., hospital), are feasible methods to move 
professionals towards standardization of practices when it comes to physician supply 
preferences. 
A methodological contribution of this study is in demonstrating the viability of a 
random effects model in analyzing the impact that alliances and systems have on the 
hospitals (Bazzoli et al. 2004; Burns and Pauly 2002). Many studies use a dummy 
variable to account for a hospital’s affiliation with a system (e.g., Chen, Preston, and 
Xia 2013; Wang et al. 2005), whereas this study uses a random effects model to 
consider the variance in supply expenses associated with systemization. Through the 
random effects model, we identify and test factors that may explain system-level 
variance, such as the level of decision-making centralization across system hospitals. 
Such a method and context can be leveraged in future research to examine how 
mergers, acquisitions, and alliances effect supply performance. 
Finally, this research adds some clarity to the inconsistent research findings in 
the healthcare management literature regarding the impact of physician-hospital 
arrangements on hospital costs (Bazzoli et al. 2004). Physician-hospital 
arrangements impact cost in multiple ways: increasing some costs, such as 
coordination and employment costs while decreasing others such as monitoring and 
other agency costs. This study shows that physician-hospital arrangements provide 
value to at least one specific source of operating costs, supply expenses.  
 The next section provides some theoretical background on agency triads in 
supply chains, explored further through a brief review of the literature about 
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professionalism and surrogate buyers. This theoretical framework is then overlaid 
onto the healthcare context, as we develop our hypotheses regarding the effect of 
physician-hospital alignment on supply performance. This is followed by a description 
of the research methods and the analysis. Finally, we discuss the results and their 
implications for theory and practice, before concluding with some thoughts about 
future research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Professionals as Surrogate Buyers 
An extensive literature about professions exists in sociology and management, 
discussing the characteristics that define professions, what differentiates them from 
other occupations, and how professional norms and behaviors impact the 
stakeholders around them (Abbott 1988; Freidson 1983). Professions are 
occupations that “apply in their work a body of knowledge and techniques acquired 
through training and experience, have a service orientation and distinctive ethics and 
have a great deal of autonomy and prestige in the modern economy.” (A. Sharma 
1997, 763). One school of thought emphasizes social system preservation and 
stewardship, where professionals uphold an ethical obligation towards society and 
their clients, and by doing so they preserve their prestige as honored servants of 
public need (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997; Freidson 1983; Parsons 1968). 
A second conception frames professionals as conforming to the classical economic 
concept of homo economicus--the rational, self-interested man (Larson 1979; A. 
Sharma 1997). 
The stewardship approach to professionalism argues for self-control and 
community control as the dominant restraints on potential opportunism of 
professionals (professional hierarchy pressures), while the agency conception argues 
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that bureaucratic control and client control (bureaucratic hierarchy pressures) are 
the major restraints against opportunistic inclinations (A. Sharma 1997). In addition 
to inhibiting potential opportunism, these restraints have unavoidable side-effects on 
professionals that impact their behaviors and norms. Of the four restraints 
mentioned above, the one that places the highest tension on professional behaviors 
and norms is bureaucratic control (i.e. when professionals are engaged with large 
bureaucratic organizations) often leading conflicts (Blau and Scott 1962; Green 
1975; Hall 1967; Sorensen and Sorensen 1974). Yet, the most prototypical 
professionals (accountants, lawyers, physicians, professors, etc.) are commonly 
employed by bureaucratic organizations, making this issue of high practical 
relevance, intriguing sociology and management researchers for many decades (Hall 
1967; Parsons 1968; A. Sharma 1997; Wallace 1995). Tension arises from the stark 
differences in bureaucratism and professionalism vis-à-vis source of authority, 
direction of loyalty, and discretion in task execution. Conflicts that arise from these 
tensions include the professional’s rejection of standards, resistance to supervision, 
and compromised loyalty towards the bureaucracy (Freidson 1988; A. Sharma 1997; 
Sorensen and Sorensen 1974). This erosion of professional power and increased 
assimilation of professionals in bureaucratic organizations was coined by Marie Haug 
(1988; 1972) as the “deprofessionalization” hypothesis. 
Eliot Freidson (1994; 1985) noticed that when professionals within bureaucracies 
faced with the changing the landscape for professions caused by commercial and 
bureaucratic forces, they coordinate among themselves and adapt in ways to retain 
their autonomy and power within the bureaucracy. Freidson’s restratification thesis 
proposes that in order to alleviate the bureaucratic pressures and the threat of 
deprofessionalization, professionals that reside in bureaucracies form internal 
hierarchies as a way to protect their autonomy and power in the bureaucratic 
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workplace. From these internal hierarchies, “professional elites” rise up to interface 
and engage with the bureaucracy and govern the rest of their professional 
colleagues, referred to as the “rank and file” professionals. Thus, for rank-and-file 
professionals, bureaucratic pressures are substituted for professional hierarchy 
pressures that the elites apply. Professional hierarchy pressure presents a more 
favorable alternative to bureaucratic pressures for professionals since it comes from 
more a legitimate source —their respected professional peers. And while professional 
pressures define guidelines and standards of work, professionals retain a sense of 
“collective” autonomy and power even as they reside within highly structured 
bureaucratic organizations (Freidson 1994; Waring 2014). 
Of particular interest to this research is the professional-bureaucratic friction in 
the supply chain function. More specifically, a professional’s duty as a surrogate 
buyer for an organization (or the organization’s client) may clash with an 
organization’s bureaucratic structure, which favors standardization over individual 
professional judgment. Michael Solomon (1986) identifies the surrogate consumer—
or buyer— as an agent of the consumer to “guide, direct, and/or transact 
marketplace activities” on his behalf (Solomon 1986, 208). Surrogate buyers are 
generally professionals (i.e. financial portfolio managers, interior designers, 
physicians, engineers, etc.) who demonstrate different degrees of influence over 
choice, ranging from descriptive (e.g. travel agents) to prescriptive (e.g. physicians) 
(Aggarwal, Cha, and Wilemon 1998). 
The service that a surrogate buyer provides is frequently reflected in the direct 
interactions between the surrogate buyer and suppliers, even when the formal 
transaction occurs between the buyer and supplier. In that respect the marketing 
literature about buying centers has recognized the level of influences of surrogate 
buyers, referring to them as the “linking pin” between organizations (Wind and 
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Robertson 1982). Recognizing the influence that surrogate buyers have on supply 
selection, suppliers often attempt to take advantage of the interaction with the 
surrogate buyer to improve chances that consumers will adopt their products 
(Aggarwal, Cha, and Wilemon 1998). For example, surrogate-supplier interactions 
are prevalent in the health sector, where medical device manufacturers form strong 
relationships with physicians, undermining the hospital’s (i.e. the buyer’s) influence 
over price negotiations and selection (Burns et al. 2009). The result is a complex 
triadic dynamic between the buyer, supplier, and surrogate buyer. 
Agency Triads 
In the past decade, supply chain research has been undergoing a significant 
paradigm shift from understanding dyadic relationships between buyers and 
suppliers, towards understanding the network of relationships around a focal firm 
(e.g., Choi and Wu 2009). Sociological network theories have been utilized as 
frameworks to guide developments in supply chain triads and network research 
(e.g., Burt 1992; Emerson 1962; Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979). Richard 
Emerson (1962) discussed triads, explain how different balancing operations can 
occur when player C is introduced to a dyad of A and B. Even though such theories 
were first developed to describe interpersonal interactions, they prove to be highly 
applicable to inter-organizational dynamics. The value that comes from these half-
century old theories comes from their clever crafting: "… these formulations have 
been so worded in the hope that they will apply across a wide range of social life." 
(Emerson 1962, 33). 
A wide variety of triadic structures have been examined, such as the buyer-
supplier-supplier triad ( Choi et al. 2002; Wu, Choi, and Rungtusanatham 2010; Wu 
and Choi 2005), and multi-tiered supplier-buyer-customer triads (Bastl, Johnson, 
and Choi 2013; Mena, Humphries, and Choi 2013). Recent studies also consider the 
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triadic context with two entities within a single organization (i.e. the purchasing 
agent and the user) interacting with each other and the external supplier, as three 
players with divergent interests (Wynstra, Spring, and Schoenherr 2015). This 
dynamic becomes particularly relevant in procurement contexts that involve 
professionals who embody the role of a surrogate buyer. Recognizing that marketing 
services are a form of professional services, Tate et al. (2010) apply the concept of 
surrogate buyers to the service triad between the buying organization, the marketing 
professional, and the supplier to develop theory about agency triads. Agency triads 
represent the case of an agent (generally the external supplier) being engaged by 
two principals from the same organization. The principals, in this case, are co-
initiators of the transaction with the agent and have some “ownership” stake in the 
transaction. The principals in the procurement context are the supply manager and 
the professional. The propositions that are developed out of Tate et al.’s (2010) case 
studies emphasize the importance of alignment between the two principals (i.e. the 
buyer and the surrogate buyer), or else the agent will act opportunistically or behave 
only to the favor of one of the two principals. 
However, the recent research about the professional service triad has been 
largely limited to conceptual and/or qualitative work (Wynstra, Spring, and 
Schoenherr 2015). Empirical research can potentially provide a significant 
contribution as procurement issues continue to increase in importance in 
organizational strategy. Conflicts between the professional surrogate buyer and the 
bureaucratic purchasing organization are persistent and prevalent in many contexts, 
suggesting a continuing need to address relationships between alignment and 
optimized sourcing strategies (Bhakoo, Prakash Singh, and Amrik Sohal 2012; Burns 
et al. 2009). 
 
  74 
The Physician-Hospital-Supplier Triad 
To study the role of the professional surrogate buyers in agency triads, we look 
to the healthcare purchasing context involves the hospital, medical device 
manufacturer, and physician (Burns et al. 2009). Physicians are widely recognized as 
both professionals (Freidson 1988; A. Sharma 1997) and as surrogate buyers 
(Aggarwal, Cha, and Wilemon 1998; Bhakoo, Prakash Singh, and Amrik Sohal 2012). 
The overall influence of physician supply selection decisions is substantial, 
considering that 60% of a typical hospital’s supply spend is on the aptly named 
physician preference items (PPI) category (Lerner et al. 2008; Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007). Finally, confining the study to a single industry controls for 
industry-specific norms and nuances. This is particularly important since, as 
mentioned earlier, the role of surrogate buyers in different industries varies 
significantly with respect to activities performed and their level of influence over the 
buyer (Solomon 1986).  
The physician-hospital-supplier triad provides a rich context for research because 
both physical products, as well as support services, are involved in the exchange 
between hospitals, physicians, and suppliers (Burns et al. 2009). Multiple governance 
mechanisms –both relational and contractual– exist between physicians, hospitals 
and suppliers. First, the hospital and supplier have an exchange relationship, and 
hospital-supplier integration is often pursued in order to achieve better purchasing 
performance (Chen, Preston, and Xia 2013). Second, multiple types of relationships 
can exist between the physician and the hospital, including employment, contract-
basis, voluntary-basis, admitting privileges etc. (Burns and Muller 2008; Casalino et 
al. 2008). 
As surrogate buyers who choose the treatment and clinical products on behalf of 
the patient and the serving hospital, physicians have a significant amount of 
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discretion in supply selection. Three factors in particular lead to the physicians 
having a high level of discretion over supply selection: (1) their professional 
expertise, (2) the combination of limited price transparency, limited comparative 
product effectiveness research, and the lack standardization regarding medical 
products nomenclature (Lerner et al. 2008; The Brookings Institute 2015) and, (3) 
the high level of service customization required to cater to diverse patient needs 
(Landry and Beaulieu 2013). Even though physicians influence a large portion of 
hospital supply spend, they pay surprisingly little attention to the costs associated 
with the medical supplies they select. Okike et al.’s (2014) study demonstrates that 
less than a quarter of the orthopedic surgeons surveyed had a good estimate (within 
20%) of the actual cost of the medical devices they selected for their patients. This is 
certainly influenced by the physicians’ stewardship and oath towards patients, but 
little consideration is taken for hospital interests. 
Finally, physicians generally develop strong relationships with suppliers their 
representatives, who support physicians in post-sale product-related services and 
education (Schneller and Smeltzer 2006; Thill 2015). Recognizing the important role 
of physicians in supply selection, suppliers very often form close relationships with 
physicians and invest heavily in these relationships by providing training, dedicated 
resources, value-added services, and other incentives (Montgomery and Schneller 
2007). Particularly for sophisticated (and high-valued) medical or surgical devices, 
supplier representatives play a significant role in assisting the physician in the use of 
the device (Lee 2013a). The extent to which suppliers work to influence physicians 
through a variety of incentive schemes has resulted in regulatory interventions, such 
as the Physician Payments Sunshine Act, to monitor the physician-supplier dyad 
(Kracov et al. 2013). The Sunshine Act requires manufacturers of drugs, medical 
devices and biologicals that participate in U.S. federal healthcare programs to report 
  76 
certain payments and items of value given to physicians and teaching hospitals 
(Iezzoni et al. 2012). 
The relationships between the hospital, physician and the supplier are 
summarized in Figure 7. The relationships described in the figure are largely in 
reference to “privileged physicians,” physicians who have operating privileges at one 
or more hospital (and perhaps contractual agreements), but are not employees of 
any hospital. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Two hypotheses are offered, based on the proposition that a higher degree of 
alignment between the buyer and the surrogate buyer will act in favor of the buyer 
who attempts to override the surrogate buyer’s bridge position (Tate et al. 2010). 
Sharma (1997) expresses a similar idea from another perspective, stating that the 
professional is less likely to behave opportunistically when there is a high degree of 
alignment and coproduction with the principal. Hence, when there is a high degree of 
  
Figure 7. The buyer-professional-supplier triad in healthcare purchasing 
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alignment between the physician and hospital, both the physician and the supplier 
are less likely to act opportunistically towards the hospital. 
Recent regulation, such as the Affordable Care Act of 2010, has pushed for more 
attention towards physician-hospital integration to better align incentives for 
achieving high quality in patient care (Burns and Pauly 2012). Burns and Muller 
(2008) review a wide continuum of strategies for physician-hospital integration. 
Broadly speaking, we hypothesize about two alignment pressures to which 
professionals may be exposed to bureaucratic pressures and professional hierarchy 
pressures. Bureaucratic pressures (related to bureaucratic and client control) 
emanate from the institutional environment in which a professional may be duty-
bound (Green 1975; M. R. Haug 1988). Professionals operating in bureaucracies may 
also face conformance pressures from the professional elites who coordinate and 
their professional colleagues through internal professional hierarchies that interface 
with the bureaucracy (i.e. community control). 
Bureaucratic Pressures 
Alignment between two parties may be a result of various forms of contracts or 
other relationship artifacts (e.g., trust, mutual gain). Certainly, agency theory speaks 
extensively about incentive alignment and various forms of contracts (Eisenhardt 
1989). The most commonly used form of contract used for agents is the employment 
contract. Physician employment in the hospitals has been a long-debated topic in 
healthcare management literature (Bazzoli et al. 2004; Berenson, Ginsburg, and May 
2007; Dynan et al. 1998). Hospitals may choose to employ physicians for numerous 
reasons such as to extend service lines, increase negotiating leverage with health 
plans, or minimize specialist search costs (Casalino et al. 2008). Nonetheless, there 
is a high level of variance across hospitals in the percentage of employed physicians, 
and the majority of physicians operate as voluntary medical staff (i.e. privileged or 
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voluntary physicians). Such physicians utilize hospitals as workshops to carry out 
their professional services, directly buying services from the hospital but not 
competing with them (Berenson, Ginsburg, and May 2007; Casalino et al. 2008). 
Voluntary physicians display the lowest level of commitment to hospital organizations 
(Burns et al. 2001; Zuckerman et al. 1998). 
While research regarding the effects of physician employment on hospital 
performance has produced mixed findings ( Bazzoli et al. 2004; Berenson, Ginsburg, 
and May 2007; Chukmaitov et al. 2014), there is consistency in demonstrating that 
salaried physicians have the highest level of commitment to the hospital when 
compared with non-salaried physicians (Burns et al. 2001; Zuckerman et al. 1998). 
Commitment is defined as "the strength of an individual’s identification with and 
involvement in the organization along three psychological dimensions: the desire to 
remain in the organization (‘continuance commitment’), willingness to exert 
considerable effort on its behalf, and belief in and acceptance of its goals and 
values." (Burns et al. 2001, 12). Embedded within this definition of commitment is 
the incentive for physicians to align their actions with the well-being of the hospital, 
which includes supply selection in a coordinated manner that conforms to a hospital's 
strategic sourcing and standardization efforts. Wallace (1995) confirms the 
employment-commitment relationship with professionals in another context. His 
study shows that lawyers are more committed to a nonprofessional organization 
when they are employed by it, rather than contracted professionals or professionals 
working in professional organizations. There is a concern, however, that the 
employment of professionals may lead to their adherence to organizational norms at 
the expenses of exercising sound professional judgment (e.g. deprofessionalization). 
Therefore, we propose that physician employment as a method of achieving 
alignment between the hospital and the physician will result in better outcomes for 
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the hospital in negotiating with suppliers, and that will reflect on the supply costs of 
the hospital.  
H1: Hospitals with a higher percentage of employed physicians incur lower 
supply expenses. 
 
Professional Hierarchy Pressures 
Besides employment, many other forms of physician-hospital integration 
arrangements exist. Hospitals often form joint venture arrangements with physician 
groups in order to achieve integration with the physicians, utilizing one of many 
potential joint venture models, such as physician-hospital organizations (PHOs), 
management service organizations (MSOs), and independent practice associations 
(IPAs) (Bazzoli et al. 2000; Dynan et al. 1998). These arrangements may be seen as 
a manifestation of Freidson’s (1994) restratification thesis. Hospitals interface with 
the professional elites that lead these professional hierarchy structures while the rest 
of the practitioners adhere to the control of these elites as an alternative to adhering 
to the hospital’s bureaucratic control. The professional elites establish boundaries 
and govern the rank-and-file practitioners while maintaining working relationship 
with non-professional groups at the hospital including procurement, contracting, and 
performance management (Waring 2014). 
Burns and Muller (2008) review various forms of physician-hospital integration 
across economic and clinical dimensions. Arrangements are generally classified as 
either tight physician-hospital arrangements or loose physician-hospital 
arrangements (Chukmaitov et al. 2014; Dynan et al. 1998).  Such a classification is 
based on the level of physician involvement in governance, capital planning, 
economic involvement and clinical integration. Furthermore, the research suggests 
that such contractual models of physician-hospital integration may be just as 
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effective in achieving organizational objectives compared to ownership models 
(Dynan et al. 1998). From the perspective of the professional, such arrangements 
provide support through an associations of like-minded colleagues around the 
professional-- a core feature of professionalization (Sorensen and Sorensen 1974). 
Physician-hospital arrangements provide an integration mechanism that, consistent 
with the restratification thesis, retains a collective autonomy among professionals 
while allowing for standardization that is facilitated by the professional elites 
(Freidson 1994; James C. Robinson 1997; J. C. Robinson and Casalino 1996). Such a 
structures reinforce self-control and community control, which restrain potential 
professional opportunism: “scrutiny by professional peers neutralizes the agent’s 
advantage of unique access to an esoteric body of knowledge and exposes the 
behavior of agents for comparison with the work and ethical standards of their 
respective community of professionals” (Sharma 1997, 780). Therefore, with such 
arrangements, the hospital can align its interests with the physicians through the 
professional elites who cater to the hospital’s interests by influencing the rest of the 
practitioners (i.e. the “rank and file” professionals) towards norms that result in 
mutual gains (Waring 2014). 
Some studies have demonstrated that physician-hospital arrangements positively 
impact cost containment initiatives and improve quality for the hospital (Burns and 
Muller 2008; James C. Robinson 1997). However, other studies have suggested that 
the cost of coordinating physician integration offsets any improvements in hospital 
costs and quality, and may even adversely impact some performances metrics 
(Burns and Pauly 2012; Chukmaitov et al. 2014; Mark et al. 1998). With respect to 
supply expenses, we hypothesize that the more physicians engaged in tightly-
integrated physician-hospital arrangements, the lower are supply expenses. This 
comes from the fact that physicians are more likely to conform to standards that 
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have been negotiated by the professional elites, and are less likely to engage in 
opportunistic behavior with the suppliers (Freidson 1985; A. Sharma 1997; Waring 
2014).  
H2: Hospitals with a higher percentage of physicians engaged in tightly-
integrated physician-hospital arrangements have lower supply expenses. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Sample 
The unit of analysis for testing the hypotheses is the hospital, which engages in 
numerous relationships with suppliers and physicians. To that end, secondary cross-
sectional data on U.S. hospitals (from the fiscal year 2013) was collected. hospitals. 
The primary source of data is the American Hospital Association’s (AHA) Annual 
Survey Database. Supplementary data was collected from the Center for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS). According to the American Hospital Association, there were 
5,627 hospitals in the U.S. in 2014. In our data, 3,879 hospitals reported their 
annual supply expense for fiscal year 2013. Psychiatric, rehabilitation, and long-term 
care hospitals were removed from the sample since they were distinctly different 
from most other hospitals in terms of their operations and utilization of supplies. We 
also disregarded hospitals with less than 100 admissions during fiscal year 2013. 
This left us with a sample of 3,321 hospitals. After excluding observations with 
missing data on the variables needed for our analysis (i.e. list-wise deletion) we were 
left with a usable sample of 2,070 observations. The limiting factor in our data was 
the case-mix index, which is a measure of patient case intensity at the hospitals, 
made publically available by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid. Even though the 
availability of this measure disqualified many observations, it could not ignore this 
measure since it provides a good aggregate measure of the types of cases that the 
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hospital gets, and is often used as a control variable in analyzes of hospitals. Table 9 
provides a summary of the observation inclusion criteria. 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of this study is the annual supply expense of hospitals. 
This measure is available from the AHA database. The definition of supply expense 
as presented by the AHA database is presented in Appendix C, as are the definitions 
are sources for all other variables used in this paper. 
While more granularity regarding the different categories of supply expenditures 
would improve the precision of our hypothesis tests, this measure is adequate (and 
conservative) since physicians have a large impact on the hospital’s overall supply 
expenditures. Medical supply costs generally account for over 60% of total supply 
costs (Young, Nyaga, and Zepeda 2015). Other research has demonstrated that 
physician preference items alone account for well over 50% of supply expenditures 
at hospitals, giving physicians a strong hand in shaping a hospital’s supply expenses 
(Lee 2013b; Montgomery and Schneller 2007; E. S. Schneller and Smeltzer 2006). 
Finally, it is worth noting that physician preference items account for a large 
proportion of the variance supply expenses. While most commodity products are 
purchased by hospitals through standardized group purchasing contracts, sourcing 
Table 9. Observation filtering criteria 
 
Filtering Criteria Sample Size 
Universe of U.S. hospitals 5,627 
Supply expense information available 3,879 
Not psychiatric, rehabilitation, or long-term care hospitals 3,381 
Admissions of 100 or more patients per year 3,321 
Physician employment information available 2,967 
Case-mix index information available 2,070 
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physician preference items occurs through direct relationships between the hospital 
and suppliers (Burns and Lee 2008). A result of this is a high level of variance in 
pricing, partly driven by a lack of price transparency and prevalence of non-
disclosure agreements in the industry (Lerner et al. 2008; Pauly and Burns 2008). As 
an example, a survey of 100 hospitals showed that the price paid for an artificial hip 
ranged from $2,000 to $9,000 (Abelson 2006). 
Some studies have used relative measures as dependent variables such as supply 
costs as a percentage of total operating expenditures (Nyaga, Young, and Zepeda 
2015), or operating costs per bed (L. Sharma et al. 2016). We opted to use the 
supply expense and control for other factors (hospital size, total expenses, labor 
expenses etc.) rather than use a ratio and risk estimating confounding effects. For 
example, it is plausible that physician employment (one of the independent variables 
in this study) correlates with higher labor costs at the hospital. High labor expenses 
relative to total expenses means that supply expense will appear smaller relative to 
total expenses, even if employment has no impact on supply expenses. We follow 
guidance from Bergh and Ketchen (2009), by including that denominator (total 
expenses) as a control variable instead. A natural log transformation to the supply 
expense measure is applied to satisfy the normality condition required for conducting 
regression analysis and mitigating the effect of outliers on the analysis. This 
transformation is common in empirical research for measures of costs, revenues and 
size. 
Since supply expense is the main focus of this study, we sought to independently 
validate our secondary data. This was to ensure that respondents of the AHA Annual 
Survey fully understood the components of the supply expense and reported 
accurate values. To do so, we contacted the supply chain leaders (e.g. “Vice 
President of Supply Chain” or equivalent) of three large health systems and 
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requested from them the 2013 supply expenses for the hospitals they manage. For 
these three systems, AHA Annual Survey reported supply expense data for 115 
hospitals. Our informants provided data for 92 of these hospitals.3 The correlation 
between the secondary AHA data and our primary data was 0.9846, providing a 
strong indication that the data provided by the AHA Annual Survey was highly 
reliable. Table 10 provides descriptive statistics for different supply cost metrics and 
Figure 8 illustrates their distributions. 
Independent Variables 
Our first measure of physician-hospital integration is the percentage of physicians 
that are employed, relative to the total number of physicians with operating 
privileges at the hospital. Besides employment, physicians engage in affiliations with 
hospitals through physician-organization arrangements (POA) with the hospital. We 
operationalize this construct using two variables as done in Chukmaitov et al.’s 
(2014) study. Dynan et al. (1998) categorize eight forms of POAs into two 
categories: tightly-integrated POAs (group practices without walls, integrated salary 
model, equity model, and foundation model) and loosely-integrated POAs 
(independent practice associations, open physician-hospital organization, closed 
                                           
3 Changes hospital ownership, between 2013 and the time we requested this data from our informants 
(late 2015) prevented our informants from accessing data for all 115 hospitals. 
Table 10. Supply expense related metrics 
 
 mean sd median min max 
Supply Expense (Mil $) 34.96 66.7 13.21 0.05 1466.75 
Total Expenses (Mil $) 190.27 309.09 80.55 3 4435.29 
Supply per admission (CMI) 2,809.04 3428.32 2295.27 100.75 118238 
Supply Expense / Total Expense 0.1613 0.08 0.15 0 0.63 
ln(Supply Expense) 16.26 1.63 16.4 10.9 21.11 
Notes: n = 3,321, except for supply per case-mix adjusted admissions (n = 2,304) since this 
measure required information about hospital admissions and case-mix index, which was not 
provides for in all observations. 
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physician-hospital organizations, and management service organizations). A 
description of each POA is presented in Appendix D. 
Hospital-level Control Variables 
We controlled for a number of different variables in this study. They are 
described briefly here, and Appendix C provides more complete descriptions and 
sources for each variable. 
Inpatient days was used as a proxy for hospital size. Other empirical studies that 
have looked at hospitals in the supply chain and operations management discipline 
have used similar measures for size including number of beds, patient admissions, or 
number of employees (Chen, Preston, and Xia 2013; Nyaga, Young, and Zepeda 
2015; L. Sharma et al. 2016). While all of these measures are highly correlated, we 
  
  
Figure 8. Distributions of supply metrics 
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believe that inpatient days provide the best measure because it accounts for 
admissions as well as for the length of stay of each patient. 
We control for the non-supply related hospital expenses. We subtracted the 
supply expense from the total expense and used that to control for other all other 
hospital expenses. This control variable also accounts for any differences in costs of 
operations based on a hospital’s location. Therefore, there was less concern about 
controlling for regional or market competition. Expenses also served as a proxy for 
hospital size, and highly correlated with inpatient days. As a consequence, inpatient 
days was dropped to avoid multicollinearity issues in the regression analysis 
We controlled for the clinical intensity of the hospital by including the case mix 
index (CMI). The CMI is an indicator of service intensity at the hospital based on the 
average complexity of the patient cases that are admitted to the hospital. This index 
is developed by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and commonly used 
in academic research to control for the patient mix in hospitals. Hospitals with a 
higher CMI are expected to require more resources (i.e. more expensive resources 
and supplies) to treat patients.  
Dummy variables were used to control for urban versus rural hospitals, based on 
classifications by the U.S. Census Bureau. We also control for academic hospitals 
versus non-academic hospitals. Finally, dummy variables are used to control for the 
ownership status at hospitals, differentiating between non-profit, investor-owned, 
and government hospitals.  
System-level Control Variables 
We consider it important to recognize that the majority of hospitals in the United 
States are engaged in other hospitals in alliances of different sizes and structures, 
commonly referred to as health systems or integrated delivery networks. These 
alliances can influence a hospital’s strategy, decision-making, and operations to 
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varying degrees depending on the level integration and centrality of the alliance. 
Previous research that examines hospitals has most commonly used a dummy 
variable to indicate whether a hospital is independent or part of a system (Chen, 
Preston, and Xia 2013; Mark et al. 1998; Wang et al. 2005). However, the diversity 
of the types of system alliances--in terms of centralized decision-making, shared 
services, geographic dispersion, services portfolios, etc.—suggests that different 
systems serve different needs and produce different outcomes (A. Chukmaitov et al. 
2009; Dubbs et al. 2004).  
The main drivers that motivate alliance behavior in healthcare are economic 
efficiencies, market power, and increased scope of operations (Bazzoli et al. 2004; 
Bazzoli et al. 2002; Begun, Zimmerman, and Dooley 2003). Dranove and Shanely 
(1995) also identify the major motivation for integration in healthcare is to centralize 
decision-making to gain economies of scale and scope advantages. More specifically 
economic efficiencies are achieved through quantity buying, avoiding duplicate 
services, and better access to capital (Markham and Lomas 1995). Certainly supply 
chain expenses are an important target when the objective is to achieve operating 
efficiencies. 
In order to measure the effects of hospital alliances, we first recognize the 
clustering effect of health systems and use a random effects model to parse out the 
variance in supply expense from the “system-level” effect. We control for the level of 
centralization in the system with a variable from the AHA Database that classifies 
health systems. This classification is widely used in the healthcare management 
literature (Bazzoli et al. 1999; Dubbs et al. 2004). Appendix E provides a description 
of each of type of system. For the purpose of this study, we created a dummy 
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variable to reflect whether a system is highly- to moderately-centralized versus 
decentralized or independent. We also controlled for the size of the health systems 
that hospitals belonged to, in terms of number of patient admissions across all 
hospitals that belong to the system. 
Tables 11.1 and 11.2, provide descriptive statistics for the hospital-level and 
system-level variables included in our analysis, respectively. 
Analysis 
To account for the nested nature of hospitals in health systems, we use a 
multilevel regression modeling approach (also known as hierarchical linear modeling) 
Table 11.1. Hospital-level descriptive statistics 
  Mean Stdev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Supply Expenses (mil) 46.84 77.75 1          
2 Physician Employment 0.20 0.27 0.12 1         
3 Tight-POA Physicians 91.23 255.7 0.45 0.21 1        
4 Loose-POA Physicians 166.7 574.0 0.19 0.06 0.19 1       
5 Inpatient days (‘000) 50.25 60.71 0.86 0.10 0.41 0.20 1      
6 Total Expenses (mil) 246.7 347.9 0.91 0.19 0.56 0.19 0.89 1     
7 Case-mix Index 1.54 0.31 0.46 0.03 0.26 0.10 0.49 0.48 1    
8 Urban location 0.71 0.46 0.27 -0.08 0.16 0.14 0.36 0.30 0.43 1   
9 Teaching status 0.10 0.30 0.60 0.16 0.43 0.16 0.65 0.65 0.38 0.20 1  
10 For-profit hospital 0.15 0.36 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.15 -0.17 0.05 1 
11 Government hospital 0.15 0.36 -0.14 -0.18 -0.13 -0.08 -0.15 -0.17 0.10 0.04 -0.12 -0.18 
Notes: n = 2,070 hospital observations; Variables 8-11 are dummy variables; Physician employment is the 
percentage of employed physicians out of total privileged physicians at the hospital; 
 
Table 11.2. Health system level descriptive statistics 
 Mean Stdev 
Media
n 
Max Min 1 2 3 
1. Number of hospitals in system 9.30 79.49 4 200 1 1   
2. Patient admissions total (thousands) 75.67 146.7 41.07 1,720.1 0.17 0.88 1  
3. Supply Expense / Total Expense  
(Average across system’s hospitals) 
18.2% 6.2% 17.6% 4.7% 46.8% -0.07 -0.03 1 
4. Centralized system 
 (1=centralized, 0=decentralized) 
0.65 0.47 1 1 0 -0.23 -0.14 -0.02 
Notes: n = 303 health systems, based on the hospital data of 2,070 hospitals, 693 hospitals were not 
affiliated with a health system 
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to account for the effect that health systems may have on individual hospital supply 
performance, following common practices used for this approach as described below 
(Hox, Moerbeek, and Van de Schoot 2010). 
 
Unconditional Means Model 
We ran an unconditional means model to determine the proportion of variance 
explained at the hospital level and system level (Bliese and Hanges 2004; Hox, 
Moerbeek, and Van de Schoot 2010). This model is useful to test the assumption of 
independence between the hospital observations. 
 ln(SupplyExpenseij) = γ0 + μ0j + εij Eq. 1 
In this model, γ0 represents the grand mean (i.e. the intercept), while μ0j 
represents the group mean difference in system j (i.e. Level-2 residual), and εij 
represents the within-group difference in hospital i within system j (i.e. the level-1 
residual). Both μ0j and εij are assumed to be normally distributed with variances of 
σ2u0  and σ2e, respectively. The unconditional means model provides estimates for the 
between-group variance and within-group variance. From these estimates, the 
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) can be calculated as follows: 
 𝐼𝐶𝐶 =
𝜎2𝜇0
𝜎2𝜇0+𝜎2𝑒 
 Eq. 2 
From our data, the intraclass correlation coefficient derived after estimating the 
unconditional means model was 0.281 (σ2u0 =0.30, and σ2e=0.75). This indicates that 
about 28.1% percent of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by 
system-level differences. In other words, the expected correlation of total annual 
supply expenses for hospitals in the same health system is 28.1%. This outcome 
confirms that a multi-level modeling approach is needed to account for non-
  90 
independence of systemized hospitals and since both variance components are 
significantly different from zero (Singer and Willett 2003). 
Random Intercept Model 
A random effects model estimates hospital-level and system-level effects on the 
dependent variable. With a random intercept model, both hospital-level and system-
level predictors can be added to the model to predict the supply expenses of 
hospitals. The structure of the random intercept model is as follows: 
ln(SupplyExpenseij) = β0j + β1j(PhyscianEmploymentij) + β2j(LoosePOAij) + 
β2j(TightPOAij) + βnj(HospitalControlsij) + εij 
β0j = γ00 + γ01(Centralizationj) + γ0m(SystemControlsj) + μ0j  Eq. 3 
 
RESULTS 
Table 12 provides the results from the random effects regression models that 
were estimated. Since our dependent variable is in the natural log scale, a one-unit 
increase in an independent variable is associated with a (βx * 100) percent increase 
in the dependent variable. The regression coefficients are also standardized, meaning 
that the units are in standard deviations. 
A hierarchical regression approach was used to assess the incremental increase 
in explanatory power from the base model to the model that includes our study 
variables (by examining the Likelihood Ratio). Model 1 is the base model which 
includes only the control variables. Model 2 provides support for Hypothesis 1, 
regarding the negative relationship between physician employment and supply 
expenses, after taking into account other control variables. Hypothesis 2, is also 
supported based on Model 3. The results suggest that the greater the number of 
physicians that engage with the hospital through tightly-integrated physician 
arrangements, the lower the hospital’s supply chain expenses after controlling for 
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other factors. Loosely-integrated physician arrangements showed no impact on 
supply expenses of a hospital. The level of centralization across hospitals within a 
system was negative and significant, suggesting that more centralized systems 
perform better in terms of controlling supply expenses.  
Table 12. Random effects model estimation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Hospital-Level Variables      
Physician Employment  
-0.018** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.021** 
(0.007) 
POA – Tightly Integrated   
-0.030** 
(0.008) 
-0.026** 
(0.008) 
POA – Loosely Integrated   
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
Hospital Expenses (ln) 
(Total Exp – Supply Exp) 
0.816** 
(0.010) 
0.820** 
(0.010) 
0.821** 
(0.010) 
0.823** 
(0.011) 
Case-Mix Index 
0.239** 
(0.009) 
0.234** 
(0.009) 
0.241** 
(0.009) 
0.240** 
(0.009) 
Government hospital 
-0.000 
(0.036) 
-0.008 
(0.036) 
-0.000 
(0.036) 
-0.006 
(0.036) 
For-profit hospital 
-0.059** 
(0.023) 
-0.063** 
(0.022) 
-0.058* 
(0.023) 
-0.062** 
(0.022) 
Urban 
-0.059** 
(0.017) 
-0.052** 
(0.017) 
-0.057** 
(0.007) 
-0.05** 
(0.017) 
Academic 
-0.041** 
(0.008) 
-0.039** 
(0.007) 
-0.034** 
(0.007) 
-0.033** 
(0.007) 
System-Level Variables     
System Centralization 
-0.023* 
(0.011) 
-0.025* 
(0.011) 
-0.022 
(0.011) 
-0.037* 
(0.012) 
Total System Admissions 
-0.038* 
(0.030) 
-0.038* 
(0.030) 
-0.037* 
(0.030) 
-0.037 
(0.030) 
     
AIC 806.92 797.39 797.92 791.28 
BIC 868.86 864.97 871.12 870.11 
Deviance (-2LogL) 784.92 773.4 771.92 763.28 
Likelihood Ratio (DF) - 11.52** (1) 13.00** (2) 21.64** (3) 
Notes: N=2,070 observations nested in 845 groups; ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
POA = Physician-hospital Arrangements 
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The hospital’s total expenses and case-mix index were significant predictors of a 
hospital’s supply expenses. For-profit hospitals are associated with lower supply 
expenses relative to non-profit hospitals, and hospitals in urban locations were 
associated with lower supply expenses. A hospital’s teaching status was found to be 
a significant predictor of supply expenses, where academic hospitals had fewer 
supply expenses, after controlling for all other factors. 
Accounting for Endogeneity 
The potential risk of endogeneity is a serious issue to tackle directly, particularly 
so in this context due to the cross-sectional nature of the sample(Antonakis et al. 
2010; Guide Jr. and Ketokivi 2015). Endogeneity, in this paper, is approached both 
theoretically and empirically. In the literature review and hypotheses section, a case 
is made for why physician-hospital integration impacts supply expenses. Supply 
expenses experience a lot higher fluctuation (driven by variations in annual 
admissions) relative to physician employment or affiliations. It is highly unlikely that 
hospitals change their physician hiring practices based on supply expenses. 
Besides the risk of reverse causality, there may be confounding variables omitted 
from our analysis that influence both the supply expenses and the decision to employ 
physicians which we do not control for. To mitigate such risk, a two-stage least 
square (2SLS) regression model is estimated (Kennedy 2008). The percentage of 
voluntary physicians at the hospitals is used as the instrument variable, due to its 
high correlation with our focal independent variable (physician employment) and low 
correlation with the dependent variable. All other variables in the 2SLS model 
matched those in Model 4 of Table 12. The results of the model appeared to be 
highly consistent with the non-instrumented model (Table 13). To formally test this 
observation, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was used to compare the regression 
estimates of the two models. The test was not significant (χ2= 17.60, df =13, p > 
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0.1), meaning that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that our model and the 
instrumented model are different from each other. This increases our confidence that 
endogeneity between physician employment and supply expenses is not a major 
concern. 
Omitting Single-Hospital Health Systems 
A substantial number of hospitals in our sample were single-hospital health 
systems (n=685), which generally consist of numerous healthcare facilities anchored 
around one hospital. Empirically, there are no issues with including single-unit 
groups in a random or fixed effects model. However, such hospitals may have 
Table 13. Supplementary analysis 
 2SLS System Hospitals  
(n = 1,372) 
Hospital-Level Variables    
Physician Employment 
-0.09** 
(0.015) 
-0.028** 
(.008) 
POA – Tightly Integrated 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.041** 
(0.010) 
POA – Loosely Integrated 
0.016* 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
Hospital Expenses (ln) 
0.833** 
(0.010) 
0.821** 
(0.012) 
Case-Mix Index 
0.237** 
(0.010) 
0.239** 
(0.011) 
Government hospital 
-0.030 
(0.037) 
0.006 
(0.044) 
For-profit hospital 
-0.076** 
(0.018) 
-0.036 
(0.037) 
Urban 
-0.025 
(0.008) 
-0.060 
(0.021) 
Academic 
-0.031** 
(0.011) 
-0.025** 
(0.009) 
System-Level Variables   
System Centralization 
-0.029** 
(0.011) 
-0.016 
(0.016) 
Total System Admissions 
-0.039* 
(0.031) 
-0.032 
(0.033) 
 
Notes: ** p<0.01, *p<0.05; in the 2SLS model, the Instrument used was 
percentage of voluntary physicians relative to total privileged physicians 
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systematic differences relative to other hospitals that are not controlled for, which 
may impact the results. To weigh the effect of such hospitals on our analysis, our 
main model (Model 4) was analyzed using a subsample that omitted all independent 
hospitals. The results are displayed in the second column of Table 13. The results are 
highly consistent with the model that includes the full data, with respect to our focal 
variables. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Theoretical Implications 
The main focus of this study is to extend a branch of supply chain triads literature 
that has recently emerged, examining the two units within the buying organization 
and supplier (Wynstra, Spring, and Schoenherr 2015). While much of the literature 
on triads has been developed using social network theory as a theoretical approach, 
we extend the study of this specific form of triad using sociology theory on 
professions with marketing perspectives on surrogate buyers and linking pins. More 
specifically, we examine the internal alignment between the two principals of an 
agency triad and how that impacts the relationship outcomes between one of the 
principals (the hospital’s supply management) and the agent. First we investigate 
employment as a mechanism to increase the commitment of the professional to the 
organization and find that it reflected positively on supply expenses. This validates 
and extends recent studies that observe of the role of physicians in supply chain 
management (Young, Nyaga, and Zepeda 2015). 
In recent years, there has been increased attention towards hospital costs and 
efficiency. An important consideration in this conversation is the role of physicians in 
supply management (Schneller 2015). As the surrogate buyers that act on behalf of 
the hospital and patients, physicians form a key bridging position between the 
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hospital and suppliers, particularly the suppliers of drugs and medical devices. 
Hospital supply managers often find themselves contending with supplier 
representatives for the physicians’ attention and alignment (Burns et al. 2009). The 
physicians themselves carry their own agenda, acting in a manner to preserve their 
professional power and autonomy.  
Employment of professionals in bureaucratic organizations has been extensively 
researched in the sociology literature (Green 1975; Sorensen and Sorensen 1974). 
The Professionalism-bureaucratism conflict is often discussed in such research due to 
the stark contrast that bureaucratic pressures exert on the professions. Unlike most 
other professions where employment is highly prevalent nowadays, in medicine, the 
percentage of physicians employed by hospitals is relatively low, average at about 
20% based on our data. To work within bureaucratic organizations while retaining 
some level of autonomy, professionals develop and conform to coordination 
structures lead by the “professional elites” that interface with the bureaucracy in 
exchange for maintaining a level of autonomy and power (Freidson 1994). This 
substitutes the more threatening bureaucratic pressure with more accepted 
professional pressure towards conformance. 
Physician-hospital arrangements which represent an instance of this phenomenon 
have had a presence in medicine and been gaining increasing interest in recent years 
(Freidson 1985; Waring 2014). These arrangements carry interesting implications to 
supply chain management in the agency triad context since they have the potential 
to drive supply chain conformance in professional practices without severely 
compromising the autonomy or power of the practitioners. With physicians acting as 
the surrogate buyers, a disregard to standardization effort by supply managers is 
cited as a major obstacle for hospital supply managers as they strive for more 
efficient sourcing (Lee 2013c; Montgomery and Schneller 2007). Using previously 
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developed conventions that classify arrangements are “tightly-integrated” and 
“loosely-integrated”, we find hospitals with more physicians that are part of tightly-
integrated physician-hospital arrangements demonstrated lower supply expenses, 
after controlling for size, expenses case-mix, and other factors. It is interesting to 
note that marketing literature about buying centers identifies a concept parallel to 
the professional elites, referring to them as “linking pins”, who invoke legitimate 
power to influence purchasing decisions (Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman 1995; Wind 
and Robertson 1982). One study concludes that: “the key role that heads of a 
professional group (e.g., chief radiologists) play in the purchase decision. A primary 
marketing effort should be directed at this member of this type of organization, who, 
through his or her intra- and inter-organizational relationships, has a major impact 
on the adoption of innovative technology and practices.” (Wind and Robertson 1982, 
182). 
This work also adds to the healthcare management literature which has been 
relatively inconsistent in its findings on the effects of physician-hospital 
arrangements. A review of the literature on physician-hospital arrangements 
concludes that “it is not clear from these results if hospitals financially benefit from 
their physician-hospital integration activities” (Bazzoli et al. 2004, 318). The studies 
reviewed generally considered overall hospital costs, without differentiating between 
the different types of costs. We examine one specific component of hospital costs—
supply expenses—which is strongly linked to physician behavior and preferences 
(Burns et al. 2009; Schneller and Smeltzer 2006). It may well be the case that the 
additional costs such as physician salaries or coordination costs of physician-hospital 
arrangements negate the cost reductions in supply expenses. It is also possible that 
the increasing attention to healthcare supply chain costs in recent years and the 
pressures to increase operating efficiency caused aligned physicians, particularly the 
  97 
influential professional elites, to be more diligent to supply chain concerns than they 
were in the past (Landry and Beaulieu 2013). Initiatives such as the government’s 
Open Payments Program (Kracov et al. 2013), which mandates transparency in 
physician-supplier relationships, provide credence towards this idea.  
Practical Implications 
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine a hospital supply 
expenses at a national level. Researchers have previously estimated that supply 
chain expenses account for about one-third of total hospital expenses (Chen, 
Preston, and Xia 2013; Kowalski 2009; Nachtmann and Pohl 2009). Based on the 
data we analyzed, expenses as a percent of total expenses was about 17%. This is 
significantly lower than values cited by previous years, which have ranged between 
25 and 40 percent. One possible reason might be in the timing of the data collection. 
Our study analyzes 2013 data while other studies have cited data from 2008 or 
earlier. It is plausible that with more attention towards hospital operations and 
supply chains, managers have reigned in supply expenditures over the past decade. 
A second reason might be due to variations in the sampling between previous studies 
and ours. Most previous studies that have provided estimates were based on survey 
data (e.g., Nachtmann and Pohl 2009), whereas this study resorted to secondary 
data report by the Hospitals to the AHA. The validation efforts we have taken to 
ensure that the supply expenses numbers reported by the hospitals in our secondary 
data were accurate provide assurance that data in the AHA survey was accurate. A 
few types of hospitals such as cardiology, orthopedic, and surgical hospitals did 
demonstrate supply expenses between 30 and 35% on average. General medical and 
surgical hospitals (which account for 80% of total hospitals) had a supply expense of 
about 16%. 
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The application of the random effects model is a departure from previous 
methods used to isolate the effects of systems on hospital decision-making and 
performance outcomes. The unconditional means model and the intraclass 
correlation coefficient suggest a system-level effect on supply expenses across 
hospitals of the same system. We assessed the effect of a system’s centralization on 
the supply expenses of hospitals belonging to that system and find that more 
centralized systems (i.e. systems with hospitals that are within close proximity of 
each other, centralized decision making, shared services, etc.) demonstrated lower 
supply expenses when controlling for other hospital factors. The size of the system, 
in terms of total patient admissions across all of the system’s hospitals, did not 
appear to influence supply chain efficiency at hospitals. 
The performance impacts of hospitals affiliated with health systems compared to 
free-standing hospitals have been debated in the healthcare management literature 
(Bazzoli et al. 2004; Burns and Pauly 2012; Burns and Pauly 2002). We hope that 
demonstrating the use of the random effects model to study system-level influences 
on hospital performance triggers more research about the effect of alliances and 
networks on supply chain performance.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Several limitations exist in this study. First, we acknowledge that our study was 
conducted at the firm level (i.e. the hospital), whereas hospital-physician-supplier 
triad dynamics occur at the transaction level. Particularly, it is in the transactions for 
high-valued physician preference items where the effects of physician integration are 
expected to be most strongly observable on supply expenses. Instead of this unit of 
analysis, we examine the hospital’s annual supply expenses, which is essentially the 
aggregate of all supply transactions that physicians may have influenced, including 
other non-clinical supply costs. However, knowing that physician preference items 
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constitute over 50% of a hospital’s supply expenses suggests that the variance in 
total annual hospital supply expenses is, in fact, being driven –at least partially-- by 
physician choice. Therefore, we consider our estimates to be conservative and expect 
to find stronger effects when examining the variance of only supply expenses that 
were associated with physician preferences. Future research can study the variance 
in costs of specific clinical departments (or even down to specific medical devices) 
across different hospitals. 
A second natural extension to this study is to elaborate further on the role of 
medical device manufacturers in this procurement triad. Our study focuses on the 
physician and hospital, and only theoretically explains the role of the suppliers. We 
did not empirically measure supplier alignment with the physicians nor with the 
hospitals. Physician-supplier alignment has gained a significant amount of attention 
in the recent years, with concerns about opportunism and misaligned incentives that 
may adversely impact the hospital and, more importantly, the patient (Kracov et al. 
2013; Wilson et al. 2008). The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has 
been charged with implementing the Sunshine Act and has called it the Open 
Payments Program. As part of this program, manufacturers are now required to 
submit annual data on payment and other transfers of value that they make to 
physicians or teaching hospitals. Perhaps, researchers can use this information 
(which is publically available at www.cms.gov/openpayments) to paint a more 
complete picture about the agency triad, and answer research questions stemming 
from the physician-supplier perspective. 
From an empirical standpoint, we have attempted to demonstrate the robustness 
of our results but recognize that no estimation method is free of issues. For example, 
we mitigate the risk endogeneity by employing a 2SLS estimation method but are 
aware that sometimes instrumental variables bring in problems of their own into the 
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estimation (Murray 2006). We have also controlled for the factors that are commonly 
included in empirical research that use hospital financial measures (A. S. Chukmaitov 
et al. 2014; Nyaga, Young, and Zepeda 2015; L. Sharma et al. 2016). Future 
research can attempt to use a similar methodology to address questions about how 
hospitals alliances impact hospital performance and what factors best dictate the 
level of supply chain integration that can be achieved through different alliance 
structures. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, our study provides important insights for both theory and practice 
regarding achieving alignment between a buyer and surrogate buyer that are part of 
an agency triads. The complexity of procurement increases with the involvement of 
professionals as surrogate buyers in the process (Aggarwal, Cha, and Wilemon 1998; 
Wind and Robertson 1982). Our results suggest that professionals can be driven 
towards more mindful supply decisions through bureaucratic pressures, such as 
employment. More interestingly, we show that pressures on practitioners from 
professional hierarchies within bureaucratic organizations also bear similar results, 
suggesting that professional elites govern practitioners towards standardized 
practices (Freidson 1994; Wind and Robertson 1982). Future research should 
consider the coordination costs associated with each mechanism of alignment. 
Empirically, our study demonstrates the value of a random effects regression model 
when studying hospital performance, examine the effects of the health systems 
which hospitals are nested in. 
Healthcare provides a fitting context to extend theory on agency triads and 
professional surrogate buyers. There is strong anecdotal evidence towards the 
increased awareness in the health sector regarding this agency triad. Hospitals are 
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more aware than ever regarding the need for physician alignment for better supply 
chain outcomes (Kutscher 2014; Lee 2013a; E. Schneller 2015). Physicians are being 
urged to pay closer attention to the implications of supply selection, especially with 
the recent push towards bundled payments and Accountable Care Organizations 
(Burns and Pauly 2012; Okike et al. 2014). Even the largest medical device 
manufacturers “have faced increased price pressure from hospitals looking to cut 
costs by negotiating better discounts on implanted devices” (Walker 2016). Certainly 
issues of hospital-physician alignment have implications beyond supply chains, but 
the research in this specific context will be very valuable to in extending theory to 
other triadic contexts beyond supply chains and healthcare. 
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1. Characteristics of CSCs 
 
1.1. Customer Selectivity 
Alpha 
"We never go to find new customers, if they come to us we sit with them and think 
carefully about [adding them as a member]." 
“Hospitals need to completely agree with our strategy and our philosophy [to be 
accepted as a customer].” 
"The biggest difference [from national distributors] is that we are very selective of our 
customers." 
"We focus on expanding the number of services we offer and increasing sales of 
existing services [as opposed to increasing customer base]." 
Beta 
 "Our current strategy is to serve [Parent healthcare system's] hospitals well." 
"… no near-future plans to provide service to other healthcare systems." 
Gamma 
 "… Growing through innovation more than through acquiring new customers." 
"We go through a rigorous screening process to ensure that customers have a 
comprehensive view." 
“We are very picky when it comes to choosing customers.” 
 
1.2. Contract Compliance 
Alpha 
"Suppliers are eager to sign up with us… because we guarantee them that market 
share." 
"The major difference between us and a GPO is that we were able to get a high level of 
compliance with purchasing agreements [over 90%] from the hospitals.” 
Beta 
"Contracting directly with a system like us provides the supplier higher commitment 
and less risk in volume production… shorter payment cycles.” 
Gamma 
"Suppliers value the compliance that [Gamma] can provide, which national GPOs 
can’t." 
"We can cut a check to the supplier and take the position of the goods directly from 
the supplier."  
 
1.3. Hospital-CSC Reporting Structure 
Alpha 
"… [In the old model] materials managers would frequently clash with Alpha, it turned 
into an issue of internal negotiations." 
Beta 
"[The prior reporting structure at Beta] resulted in friction between the organization's 
shared goals and the incentives of the individual hospitals." 
Gamma 
"[The new reporting structure at Gamma] reduced the noise." 
"It is less likely that someone you can fire will shout at you and hang up." 
"… we realized early on that compromising some autonomy at the lower levels had 
more benefits for our model to drive down costs and increase service levels." 
 
2. Managing Supply Chain Complexity 
 
2.1. Supply Base Reduction - Reducing the Components 
Alpha 
"Standardization efforts focus on the middle 80% of spend, through about 150 
suppliers." 
“We don’t carry 35 bedpans like a national distributor would, we only carry one.” 
 Beta 
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"… capitated model to satisfy the largest number of physicians with the least number 
of suppliers." 
"Value analysis teams work to reduce product choices for commodities down to one or 
two." 
"Several millions in savings from standardizing supply contracts in cardiology and cath 
labs." 
Gamma 
"We always seek to achieve better prices for our products through standardization or 
negotiations with suppliers." 
"We were able to standardize spine implants, going from 13 vendors to 1.” 
"… a smaller number  of clinically engaged suppliers." 
 
2.2. Disintermediation - Reducing Interrelatedness 
Alpha 
"[Prior to Alpha's disintermediation] The vender-physician relationship was too 
powerful and hospitals had no leverage." 
"… greatly reduced the supply-side salesmen at hospitals salesmen or physicians need 
to follow a formal process through [Alpha] to request new products." 
"We have an agreement with [national distributor], and our goal is to shrink our 
business with them to zero." 
"We provide much better payment terms than a hospital's purchasing department 
would, making suppliers happy." 
Beta 
"The business with [distributor] has been steadily shrinking" 
"GPO spend is relatively stable year-to-year, but also steadily decreasing" 
Gamma 
 [Discussing disintermediation of suppliers and internalizing the role of the sales rep]: 
"Physicians were heavily involved and contributed to the selection of the sales reps to 
be hired." 
"… required disintermediation to solve many of these issues” 
"GPO and distributors were then slowly being phased out… [they were] not happy 
about it." 
 
3. Supply Chain Innovation 
 
“At one point we were all wearing multiple hats” 
"… try to bring in ideas and learnings from other industries." 
“There is a strong entrepreneurial spirit.” 
"[Referring to cost cutting strategies] We had to get creative." 
"We seek new opportunities both by listening to our customers and our own employees." 
“I would be disappointed if a year went by and there wasn’t a major innovation introduced by 
[Gamma]” 
"We see [Gamma] growing through innovation more than through acquiring new customers." 
"We had to imagine a new model."  
 
4. Transformational Leadership 
 
"Project management and change management were critical in rolling out the model." 
"[The CSC operating model] requires a lot of courage and a strong opinion on the matter to 
move to such a model…" 
"Many healthcare system executives that tour [Alpha] do not currently have the background in 
supply chain and logistics on their team, and get scared.” 
"The biggest worry was having the talent (people) to succeed in such a large task." 
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Survey Items Mean (SD) Stdized Loadings 
 Buyer Supplier Buyer Supplier 
Trust (α = 0.919; 0.884)     
Partner keeps commitments 5.72 (1.07) 5.61 (1.20) 0.878 0.818 
Partner works for the best interests of the 
relationship 
5.55 (1.12) 5.27 (1.25) 0.920 0.934 
Partner wants your organization to succeed 5.70 (1.13) 5.14 (1.33) 0.855 0.787 
Performance (α = 0.920; 0.867)     
Strategic advantage 5.08 (1.14) 5.25 (1.15) 0.831 0.830 
Meeting organization's mission 5.29 (1.16) 5.19 (1.17) 0.894 0.873 
Financial viability 5.40 (1.11) 5.28 (1.16) 0.834 0.756 
Service effectiveness 5.46 (1.07) 5.40 (1.20) 0.853 0.666 
Contracting (α = 0.920; 0.846)     
Contract language that mitigates problems 5.31 (1.21) 4.88 (1.31) 0.830 0.681 
Fair contract negotiations 5.58 (1.11) 5.31 (1.26) 0.942 0.914 
Clear contractual specifications 5.55 (1.12) 5.33 (1.24) 0.907 0.814 
Information Sharing (α = 0.840; 0.835)     
Partner provides product performance data 4.59 (1.52) 4.28 (1.81) 0.806 0.829 
Partner provides product utilization data 4.88 (1.48) 4.58 (1.74) 0.693 0.816 
Partner provides clinical evidence-basis for 
product choice 
4.49 (1.66) 4.47 (1.85) 0.874 0.763 
Dedicated Resources (α = 0.810; 0.747)     
Partner provides personnel for product 
management 
4.91 (1.45) 4.80 (1.57) 0.698 0.725 
Partner provides personnel for clinical support 4.74 (1.62) 4.90 (1.56) 0.866 0.770 
Partner provides equipment for product 
support 
4.30 (1.72) 3.44 (1.90) 0.755 0.634 
Dependency (α = 0.849; 0.722)     
Reliance on product services 4.52 (1.40) 4.25 (1.56) 0.795 0.726 
Partner product is unique with few 
competitors 
4.43 (1.66) 4.09 (1.70) 0.764 0.555 
Product requires organizational 
service/support 
4.33 (1.47) 4.16 (1.56) 0.910 0.755 
Conflicting Views (α = 0.946; 0.769)     
Partner not sharing key performance 
indicators 
4.53 (1.71) 4.63 (1.43) 0.841 0.629 
Lack of price transparency 4.93 (1.80) 4.09 (1.51) 0.889 0.630 
Incongruent economic priorities 4.79 (1.73) 4.68 (1.39) 0.950 0.761 
Incongruent views of sales and marketing 
spending 
4.56 (1.66) 4.18 (1.41) 0.921 0.692 
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 Variable Description Source 
1 Supply Expenses (mil) 
“The net cost of all tangible items that are expensed 
including freight, standard distribution cost, and sales 
and use tax minus rebates. This would exclude labor, 
labor-related expenses, and services as well as some 
tangible items that are frequently provided as part of 
labor costs.” (AHA Survey 24) 
AHA Database 
2 Physician Employment 
The percentage of employment physicians at the 
hospital, relative to the total physicians with operating 
privileged. 
AHA Database 
3 Tight-POA Physicians 
The number of physicians in tight arrangements. Refer 
to Appendix D for more details about each 
arrangement in this category. 
AHA Database 
4 Loose-POA Physicians 
The number of physicians in loose arrangements. Refer 
to Appendix D for more details about each 
arrangement in this category. 
AHA Database 
5 Inpatient days (‘000) 
Aggregate days of care rendered to patients during the 
fiscal year(in thousands). Day of discharge is only 
counted if the patient is admitted on the same day.  
AHA Database 
6 
Hospital Expenses 
(non-supply related) 
Total Hospital Expenses minus supply expenses (in 
millions) 
AHA Database 
7 Case-mix Index 
 “A hospital’s CMI represents the average diagnosis-
related group (DRG) relative weight for that hospital. It 
is calculated by summing the DRG weights for all 
Medicare discharges and dividing by the number of 
discharges.” (https://www.cms.gov/) 
Center for 
Medicare and 
Medicaid 
Services 
8 Urban location 
Categorical variable, indicating whether the hospital is 
in an urban location (1) or rural location (0), based on 
the CBSA (core base statistical area) code  
AHA Database, 
U.S. Census 
Bureau 
9 Teaching status 
Hospital is a member of Council of Teaching Hospital of 
the Association of American Medical Colleges (COTH) 
AHA Database, 
Association of 
American 
Medical 
Colleges 
11 
Hospital operating 
status 
Categorical variable indicating the hospital’s operating 
status: 
 Nongovernment, not for profit. Controlled by not-
for-profit organizations, including religious 
organizations, community hospitals, cooperative 
hospitals, hospitals operated by fraternal societies, 
and so forth. 
 Investor owned, for profit.  Controlled on a for-profit 
basis by an individual, partnership, or a profit-
making corporation. 
 Government, federal. Controlled by an agency or 
department of the federal government. 
AHA Database 
12 System Centralization 
A system-level categorical variable that indicated 
whether the system is considered to be centralized or 
decentralized. Refer to Appendix C for more 
information regarding the taxonomy 
AHA Database 
13 
Total System 
Admissions 
The aggregate number of patients admissions across 
all hospitals of a system 
AHA Database 
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Source: AHA 2013 Annual Survey Database 
  
POA Type Description 
Loosely-integrated POAs*  
Independent practice 
association (IPA) 
A legal entity that holds managed care contracts. The IPA 
then contracts with physicians, usually in solo practice, to 
provide care either on a fee-for-services or capitated 
basis. The purpose of an IPA is to assist solo physicians in 
obtaining managed care contracts. 
Open physician-hospital 
organization (PHO) 
A joint venture between the hospital and all members of 
the medical staff who wish to participate. The PHO can act 
as a unified agent in managed care contracting, own a 
managed care plan, own and operate ambulatory care 
centers or ancillary services projects, or provide 
administrative services to physician members. 
Closed physician-hospital 
organization (PHO) 
A PHO that restricts physician membership to those 
practitioners who meet criteria for cost effectiveness 
and/or high quality. 
Management services 
organization (MSO) 
 A corporation, owned by the hospital or a 
physician/hospital joint venture, that provides 
management services to one or more medical group 
practices. The MSO purchases the tangible assets of the 
practices and leases them back as part of a full-service 
management agreement, under which the MSO employs 
all non-physician staff and provides all 
supplies/administrative systems for a fee. 
Tightly-integrated POAs*  
Group practice without walls 
Hospital sponsors the formation of, or provides capital to 
physicians to establish, a “quasi” group to share 
administrative expenses while remaining independent 
practitioners. 
Integrated salary model 
Physicians are salaried by the hospital or another entity of 
a health system to provide medical services for primary 
care and specialty care. 
Equity model 
Allows established practitioners to become shareholders in 
a professional corporation in exchange for tangible and 
intangible assets of their existing practices. 
Foundation 
A corporation, organized either as a hospital affiliate or 
subsidiary, which purchases both the tangible and 
intangible assets of one or more medical group practices. 
Physicians remain in a separate corporate entity but sign a 
professional services agreement with the foundation 
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The following excerpt and table are taken from the supplementary material of the 
AHA 2013 Annual Survey Database: 
 
Research using existing theory and AHA Annual Survey data identified a reliable set of five 
distinct groups of health systems that share common strategic/structural features.  This 
identification system was developed jointly by the American Hospital Association’s Health 
Research and Educational Trust and Health Forum, and the University of California-Berkeley. 
For further information on the development of the taxonomy please see: Bazzoli, GJ; Shortell, 
SM; Dubbs, N; Chan, C; and Kralovec, P; “A Taxonomy of Health Networks and Systems: 
Bringing Order Out of Chaos” Health Services Research, February; 1999. 
 
A health system is assigned to one of five categories based on how much they differentiate 
and centralize their hospital services, physician arrangements, and provider-based insurance 
products. Differentiation refers to the number of different products or services that the 
organization offers. Centralization refers to whether decision-making and service delivery 
emanates from the system level more so than individual hospitals. 
 
Label Description 
Centralized Health 
System 
 
A delivery system in which the system centrally organizes individual 
hospital service delivery, physician arrangements, and insurance product 
development.  The number of different products/services that are offered 
across the system is moderate. 
Centralized Physician/ 
Insurance Health 
System 
 
A delivery system with highly centralized physician arrangements and 
insurance product development.  Within this group, hospital services are 
relatively decentralized with individual hospitals having discretion over the 
array of services they offer.  The number of different products/services 
that are offered across the system is moderate. 
Moderately Centralized 
Health System 
 
A delivery system that is distinguished by the presence of both centralized 
and decentralized activity for hospital services, physician arrangements, 
and insurance product development.  For example, a system within this 
group may have centralized care of expensive, high technology services, 
such as open heart surgery, but allows individual hospitals to provide an 
array of other health services based on local needs.  The number of 
different products/services that are offered across the system is moderate. 
Decentralized Health 
System 
 
A delivery system with a high degree of decentralization of hospital 
services, physician arrangements, and insurance product development.   
Within this group, systems may lack an overarching structure for 
coordination.  Service and product differentiation is high, which may 
explain why centralization is hard to achieve.  In this group, the system 
may simply serve a role in sharing information and providing 
administrative support to highly developed local delivery systems centered 
around hospitals. 
Independent Hospital 
System 
 
A delivery system with limited differentiation; hospital services, physician 
arrangements, and insurance product development.  These systems are 
largely horizontal affiliations of autonomous hospitals. 
 
